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The Hindu June 04, 2004 Opinion - Leader Page Articles REDUCING NUCLEAR RISK By M. V. Ramana & R. Rajaraman As a primary risk reduction measure India should not deploy nuclear-armed missiles and aircraft or induct an early warning system. THE RECENT change of Government offers an important opportunity to reconsider Indian nuclear policy. The Common Minimum Programme of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) is brief on this subject and mentions only that India will maintain a credible nuclear programme while evolving demonstrable and verifiable confidence-building measures with its nuclear neighbours. In and of itself, such a statement is not very different from what leaders of the Bharatiya Janata Party have said in the past. If the new Alliance wants to put a distinctive stamp on our nuclear policy, it would have to distinguish itself from the BJP by implementing some concrete changes through policy declarations and directives as well as actual on-the-ground practice. We would like to offer two specific recommendations that do not compromise national security in any real sense but are expressions of the commitment to nuclear disarmament and constitute confidence building measures. The most important and basic commitment that the UPA should offer is not to deploy nuclear weapons. Deployment means keeping the warheads armed with nuclear explosives on delivery vehicles (ballistic missiles or aircraft) and keeping them ready for attacking a designated target. The United States and Russia keep thousands of nuclear weapons deployed on high alert, ready to be launched in a matter of minutes, owing to a combination of Cold War crises, military planning, technological advances, and nuclear doctrines, all tied closely to one another. From all public accounts, India and Pakistan are yet to deploy nuclear-armed missiles and bombers on a regular basis. However, there are early signs of the same factors that led the U.S. and Russia to deploy their weapons. It is this impending change of weapon status that should be explicitly and definitely ruled out by the UPA Government. At least two dangers would result from such deployment. The first and greatest danger is that deployment opens up the possibility that nuclear weapons may be used accidentally or by unauthorised personnel, especially during a crisis. Deployment will almost inevitably involve delegating some authority to military officers on the field, allowing them to make the vital decision about using nuclear weapons. This is compounded by the poor state of communication obtaining in South Asia. (In November 2001, it was reported that Prime Minister Vajpayee could not make a direct phone call from Air India One.) It is the threat of unauthorised use that command and control systems are supposed to avert. However, even the most advanced command and control systems are not foolproof. (The many hazards of command and control for South Asia are discussed in Zia Mian's essay in M.V. Ramana and C. Rammanohar Reddy, eds., Prisoners of The Nuclear Dream [New Delhi: Orient Longman, 2003]). Deployed nuclear weapons pose conflicting demands. On the one hand, they have to be dispersed and with the military so that they could be used upon warning of an attack. On the other hand, the decision to use these weapons is so momentous that one would like only the highest political levels to be able to order their use, that too after due deliberation. All this is complicated by the widespread, large-scale effects of nuclear war, which could disrupt communication systems that link leaders or commanders with field personnel. The complexities involved in preparing for all contingencies, especially given the short flying times for Indian and Pakistani missiles and airplanes to each other's territory, would inexorably involve situations where military personnel would have the authority to launch a nuclear attack without explicit orders from the highest levels of political authority. This possibility is ruled out by not deploying nuclear weapons. The second risk resulting from deployment, over and above the risk of nuclear war from unauthorised use, is of serious accidents involving nuclear weapons themselves or their delivery vehicles such as missiles and aircraft. Such accidents might be initiated by an explosion or fire involving the delivery vehicles, especially missiles. A recent example of a serious accident involving a missile occurred on February 23, 2004 at the Sriharikota High Altitude Range. Engineers were testing a motor for the Agni missile when it caught fire and exploded, killing at least six people. If such an accident were to occur in an Agni missile loaded with a nuclear warhead, it could well lead to the dispersal of fissile material (plutonium or enriched uranium) into the atmosphere, potentially causing thousands of fatal cancers among the nearby population. The above estimate of casualties is not for a nuclear explosion, but only for the detonation of the chemical explosive in the weapon. This chemical explosion could well trigger a nuclear explosion. An accidental nuclear explosion with a yield of 15 kilotons, the same as the weapon detonated over Hiroshima, would destroy over 5 square kilometres from the combined effects of blast and firestorms. Over 24 square kilometres would be subject to radioactive fallout at such levels that half the healthy adult population would die of radiation sickness. If this were to happen in the vicinity of a large South Asian city, several hundreds of thousands of people would die. In addition, such an explosion, especially in times of crises, might be assumed to be a nuclear attack and lead to a nuclear response. Thus an accidental nuclear explosion may even initiate a nuclear war, which could cause millions of casualties. In fact these risks prompt going beyond simply non-deployment of nuclear weapons to actually keeping the weapons disassembled. Our second recommendation is that the UPA Government immediately stop installing early warning systems. These systems are intended to detect incoming ballistic missiles and, it is hoped, inform decision makers that nuclear war has begun before the warheads themselves explode. The last few years have witnessed the acquisition of key components of an early warning network, including the Green Pine radar from Israel. There have also been reports of attempts to purchase the Arrow anti-ballistic system. However, as we have calculated in some detail elsewhere, these systems simply cannot offer more than a few minutes of warning in the South Asian context. This is grossly insufficient for decision making in any meaningful sense of the term. The deployment of a hugely expensive early warning system is worse than useless. It brings with it the danger of accidental nuclear war due to false alarms and miscalculations. There are numerous examples from the experience of the U.S. and Russia. Over the decades, the U.S. built an elaborate and sophisticated system, involving a worldwide network of satellites and radars and using state-of-the-art technology, with layers of filters to remove false signals. Yet from 1977 through 1984, the only period for which official information has been released, the early warning systems gave an average of 2,598 warnings each year of potential incoming missiles attacks. Of these about 5 per cent required further evaluation. Needless to say, all of them were false. Information about the Russian experience is limited, but there have been many false alarms there too. In 1995, for instance, a Norwegian scientific rocket launch was interpreted by the Russian early warning system as a possible attack and the matter went all the way up the command chain to President Yeltsin. Fortunately in all these cases, the mistake was discovered in time to forestall any counter attack decision. Nevertheless, the shocking fact is that on many of these occasions, the world was just minutes away from a possible nuclear holocaust through error. The geographical proximity of Pakistan and India does not allow us even the minor reassurance that may be sought from the much greater distance between the U.S. and USSR, and longer missile flight times. The only sure way to eliminate nuclear risks is to abolish all nuclear weapons, regionally and globally. This should be the goal of all rational and peace loving people. The CMP assurance that the new Government "will take a leadership role in promoting universal, nuclear disarmament and working for a nuclear weapons-free world" is therefore welcome. But India and Pakistan already possess dozens of nuclear weapons. With every additional day that they exist they continue to pose the serious dangers we have outlined. Therefore even as we strive to eliminate them altogether, it would in the meantime be prudent to institute various risk reduction measures, which would lower the chances of a destructive nuclear war. The primary risk reduction measures we recommend is that India not deploy, as a matter of stated formal policy and practice, nuclear-armed missiles and aircraft, or induct an early warning system. This requires no new technologies or organisations - indeed not deploying would reduce enormously the demands on nuclear infrastructure while increasing safety and national security. (M. V. Ramana is Fellow, Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies in Environment and Development and co-editor of Prisoners of the Nuclear Dream. R. Rajaraman is Professor Emeritus of Theoretical Physics, Jawaharlal Nehru University and Visiting Research Scholar at the Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University, U.S.) Courtes:Harsh Kapoor www.sacw.net |
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June09, 2004 - [India Thinkers Net]We dont agree with cong's eco policies ! - CPI-M >> |
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