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From: Regi P George <george_regi@yahoo.com> Date: Tue Nov 30, 2004 0:39pm Subject: Unravelling the Self-image of the Indian Bomb Lobby Unravelling the Self-image of the Indian Bomb Lobby The sociology of the Indian bomb lobby, the intelligentsia and middle class is intimately and unavoidably connected to the wider sociology of change in India. What is suggested here is that it is these very processes that are central to explaining why India went openly nuclear and why elite nationalism continues to favour the possession and development of a nuclear weapons system. The decisive factor in the transition of India from ambiguity to declared nuclear status was played by a coterie within the decision-making circle. It then took along with it an already enthusiastic pro-bomb following, as well as a taken-by-surprise but easily adjusting and suddenly enthusiastic remaining part of the newly created bomb lobby. Achin Vanaik I Composition of the Bomb Lobby The Indian bomb lobby does not encompass all those who now believe that the state must possess a nuclear weapons system. These are mostly of post-Pokhran II vintage knowing and caring little about the earlier posture of nuclear ambiguity. They have simply moved with the times. Nor can this lobby be so narrow as to comprise only that group – mostly ideologues and senior leaders in and around the Sangh parivar – which has most consistently argued for the bomb. This group has had an unwavering, ideologically motivated commitment to making the bomb should it ever come to power, and bided their time. Barring the odd intellectual or media figure, the members of this group have not been serious participants in the decades-long ‘public debates’ over possible Indian nuclearisation (especially during the 1994-96 debate on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)) which have mostly taken place in Delhi-based seminar circles amongst a familiar grouping of ‘strategic experts’ or have occasionally surfaced in written form in English language dailies or in established defence and foreign policy journals. Sangh leaders knew perfectly well that going nuclear depended on their accession to power only, not through the popularisation of winning arguments in the market place of clashing ideas. Thus the Sangh’s key decision-makers never adjusted their thinking to suit the ‘strategic experts’. Indeed, up to the very eve of May 11, 1998, the overwhelming majority of such experts were committed to maintaining the existing posture of nuclear ambiguity, that is, not going openly nuclear. As the Sangh leaders correctly understood, it would be the ‘community of strategic experts’ and the other party constituents of the ruling National Democratic Alliance (NDA) (both of whom were kept in the dark) who would soon enough adjust to the fiat accompli of the Pokhran II tests. As best approximation then, the Indian bomb lobby is made up of a ‘strategic core’ of key decision-makers and implementers (placed either in government or at the very top of Sangh organisations like the RSS, BJP, etc) surrounded (after Pokhran II) by an additional layer of important opinion-makers and shapers. The lobby comprises (a) the principal ideologues/leaders of the Sangh; (b) Key scientocrats heading important government departments like the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), the Defence, Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), that section in the space programme aligned with Abdul Kalam. These people have had a vested interest in being identified with the ‘success’ of the ongoing nuclear weapons programme, which diverted scrutiny away from departmental and project failures;1 (c) Politicians-administrators involved in the key decisions relating to the initiation and continuation of the nuclear weapons programme; and (d) ‘Strategic experts’ (located mainly in think tanks) who provide much of the arguments defending the nuclear weapons programme. To play their critical role as justifiers of nuclearisation they must have a definite presence in the public media or in the ‘high-level’ conference networks attended by senior government officers and foreign dignitaries. Though formally outside of government (often only by virtue of retirement) these ‘experts’ see themselves as policy advisers and are occasionally ‘rewarded’ by reigning governments, e g, official honours, trips abroad as spokespersons of the government, consultants to the government in official or semi-official bodies like the National Security Advisory Board, etc. The whole article can be read at: http://www.epw.org.in/showArticles.php?root=2004&leaf=11&filename=7923&filetype=html |
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December05, 2004 - [India Thinkers Net]China tests ballistic missile submarine >> |
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