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Subject: [India Thinkers Net]India,China,US :analyzing the triangle (Sukla Sen) - September26, 2005



From: Sukla Sen <suklasen@yahoo.com>
Date: Mon Sep 26, 2005
Subject: India, China, US: Analysing the Triangle  

http://japanfocus.org/article.asp?id=400

Redrawing India??™s Geostrategic Maps with China and the
United States

By Lora Saalman


[This comprehensive survey of India??™s growing military
strength and geostrategic relationships involving
China, the United States and Russia reveals the
interplay between economic and military-nuclear power
in a region that is doubly volatile, as the scene of
recent nuclear breakthroughs and rapid changes in
military and economy might. Noting the predominantly
military character of the U.S.-Indian relationship,
and the predominantly economic and resource-driven
character of the unfolding China-Indian relationship,
Lora Saalman raises important issues of regional
development in an era of military insecurity. Japan
Focus.]

India has been revising its strategic maps with China
and the United States, both literally and
figuratively. During early spring of 2005, Chinese
Premier Wen Jiabao handed Indian Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh a map reformatted to reflect the
long-contested region of Sikkim as part of India. By
summer, the United States handed India defense,
nuclear, and space technology proposals, promising to
transform more than just physical territory. Articles
in India-based Bharat Rakshak Monitor attribute the
warming of Sino-Indian ties as a means to counter the
U.S. presence in Asia.[1] China's Party organ People??™s
Daily (Renmin Ribao) asserts that strengthened
Indo-U.S. relations are targeted at containing China??™s
rise.[2] In these analyses, China and the United
States are portrayed as focusing their strategic
concerns squarely upon each other, while India
maneuvers to secure political, economic and military
benefits.

Yet, there remains a crucial and often missed
difference between the Chinese and the U.S. approaches
toward engaging India. China??™s current inducements for
India primarily focus on economic integration and
energy development. By contrast, the U.S. has made
dual-use technology transfer the centerpiece of its
engagement strategy. At India??™s level of technological
sophistication, however, U.S. dual-use nuclear, space,
and military cooperation promises to enhance India??™s
political weight and military footprint in ways that
are more likely to conflict with long-term U.S.
strategic goals than with those of China. Rather than
encircling China as the People??™s Daily foresees, the
United States may instead be containing its own
long-term interests.

China and the United States Engage India

On April 1, 2005, China and India took a symbolic step
toward strategic cooperation as Chinese Premier Wen
Jiabao and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh issued
the India-China Strategic and Cooperative Partnership
for Peace and Prosperity.[3] This joint statement
lauded the ???global and strategic character??? of
Sino-Indian relations. It offered economic incentives
for expanded cooperation, with the objective of nearly
doubling bilateral trade to $20 billion by 2008. The
two parties also announced the formation of a
China-India Steering Committee on Scientific and
Technical Cooperation in education, science,
healthcare, tourism, cultural exchange, and
agriculture. India and China provisionally resolved
the long standing dispute over Sikkim and agreed to
cooperate in developing foreign petroleum and natural
gas resources.[4]


Only a few months later, on June 28th, India??™s Defense
Minister Pranab Mukherjee met with U.S. Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld to sign the New Framework for
the U.S.-India Defense Relationship.[5] This agreement
set forth detailed measures involving joint military
exercises, defense and technology trade, missile
defense, and exchanges on defense strategy, and
intelligence. On July 18th India??™s Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh and U.S. President George W. Bush
issued a joint statement, further expanding the scope
of the existing India-U.S. Next Steps in Strategic
Partnership (NSSP) and High Technology Cooperation
Group (HTCG). The United States committed to signing a
Science and Technology Framework Agreement, to
building closer ties in space exploration, satellite
navigation and launch, facilitating a U.S.-India
Working Group on Civil Space Cooperation, and to
removing certain Indian organizations from the
Department of Commerce??™s Entity List. Most notably,
the United States agreed to seek adjustment of U.S.
laws for full civil nuclear cooperation and trade with
India, including reactor fuel supplies, and to consult
with its partners on India??™s participation in the
International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor
(ITER) and in the Generation IV International
Forum.[6] These proposals are under debate in the U.S.
Congress and will require amendment of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 and the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Act of 1978, as well as the acquiescence of the
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) before full cooperation
begins.[7] This time lag offers an opportunity to
reflect on the impact of dual-use cooperation on
India, China, and ultimately the United States.



U.S. Assistance, Indian Indigenization, and the Impact
on China

In spite of emphasizing self-reliance in the wake of
sanctions following its 1998 atomic tests, India is
not new to foreign assistance.[8] Nor is India a
novice in creating linkages between its civilian
nuclear and space advances and its nuclear weapon and
missile programs. India??™s initial nuclear test in 1974
utilized plutonium from its Canadian and ostensibly
civilian Cirus nuclear reactor, while its 1989 launch
of the first Agni ballistic missile comprised
technology gained from the U.S. Scout satellite
launcher. Similarly, the dual-use technology mentioned
under the Indo-U.S. defense framework and joint
statement may assist India in its ongoing pursuit of
advances in nuclear weapons technology, longer range
ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched ballistic
missiles.

Indigenization and Nuclear Assistance

The most significant shift in U.S. policy brought on
by the July 18th U.S.-Indian joint statement relates
to dual-use nuclear cooperation. India has already
managed to parlay decades of Russian, U.S., German,
and French assistance into what is now a robust
indigenous civilian and military nuclear program.
While nuclear power only occupies an estimated 3.3 to
5 percent of India??™s energy production, India is
actively pursuing nuclear power development with
important civilian as well as military
implications.[9] In October 2004, India launched the
commercial phase of its 500 MWe Prototype Fast Breeder
Reactor (PFBR) at Kalpakkam.[10] Four more such fast
reactors have been announced for construction by 2020.
During April 2005, the Bhabha Atomic Research Center
(BARC) also commissioned an Integral Test Loop (ITL)
to simulate the main heat transport system and safety
system of the thorium-based Advanced Heavy Water
Reactor (AHWR).[11]

For uranium-poor and thorium-rich India,[12] the
development of thorium-fed fast breeder reactors makes
it even less susceptible to the vagaries of
international fuel supply and sanctioning. Fast
breeder reactors produce more than they consume,
offering India a steady and renewable future supply of
weapons grade fuel. AHWRs in particular burn
thorium/U-233 oxide producing spent fuel that can be
reprocessed.[13] India??™s PFBR at Kalpakkam and its
Kamini 40 MWt Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR) both
breed U-233.[14] While less of a proliferation risk
due to its high radioactivity, U-233 has fissile
properties comparable to U-235 used for nuclear
weapons production.[15] India??™s recent technical
developments suggest that it has made significant
strides towards mastering, indigenizing, and expanding
the scope of its nuclear fuel cycle.

However, not all components of India??™s nuclear program
are moving forward. David Albright, executive director
of the Institute of Science and International Security
(ISIS), and Henry Sokolski, executive director of the
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, have pointed
to India??™s less than proven track record in
successfully operating its fast breeder reactors and
reprocessing plants.[16] This is where U.S.
technological assistance to India??™s civilian nuclear
program can offer a degree of streamlining for both
India??™s civilian and, by extension, military nuclear
programs. Fusion technology, whether garnered through
the ITER project or under the U.S.-India Energy
Dialogue, could help overcome some of India??™s civilian
and military technological gaps.[17] India??™s alleged
failed detonation of a thermonuclear weapon during its
multiple 1998 tests is just one such lacuna.[18]
Fusion technology not only has applications in
thermonuclear weapons, but also could assist in
nuclear warhead miniaturization to extend missile
launch range and payload capacity. This will enable
India to produce a higher nuclear yield and to
successfully mount its nuclear weapons on missiles to
fly greater distances.

Beyond hypothetical assistance and rhetoric, as of
August 30, 2005, the United States has already removed
Tarapur (TAPS 1 and 2), Rajasthan (RAPS 1 and 2), and
Kudankulam (1 and 2) from the U.S. Entity List,
mitigating export licensing requirements.[19] For
these particular reactors, assistance will be
monitored under International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) safeguards. However, for other reactors and
facilities demarcating the dividing line between
civilian and military use will be a tedious, and many
Indian and U.S. analysts suggest impossible, process.
Although management of the AHWR unveiled in August
2005 has been ostensibly transferred to the civilian
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), the unit has
the ability to produce U-233 that can be reprocessed
for nuclear weapons. Furthermore, it was designed by
BARC, a known contributor to India??™s nuclear weapons
program.[20] Due to the overlap between India??™s
civilian and military programs, there remains the
potential for diversion of technology, equipment, and
potentially even materials to nuclear weapons
programs.

Nuclear Impact on China

Whether U.S.-assisted or indigenous, India??™s nuclear
advances carry strategic weight for Sino-Indian
relations. Both countries espouse a nuclear doctrine
based on minimum deterrence. Yet, India continues to
engage in fissile material production to augment its
stockpile. The 2005 edition of the book Deadly
Arsenals has already expanded its Indian weapons
estimates to 75-110 nuclear devices.[21] ISIS further
provides an indication of India??™s capabilities for
future nuclear arsenal expansion, estimating in August
2005 that India possesses a total of between 13.9 and
14.9 metric tons of civilian and military highly
enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium (Pu).[22]

In comparison, China has stopped fissile material
production, but is believed to have a sufficient
stockpile, estimated at 31.1 civilian and military
metric tons of HEU and Pu[23] to double or triple its
current arsenal of approximately 400 nuclear
weapons.[24] Despite the current differential, there
is nothing in the U.S.-India joint statement that
suggests India will be constrained in its current
fissile material build-up. Any future commitments to a
contentious Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty aside,
India has repeatedly stated that it will continue to
build up its plutonium stockpile until it reaches a
level that provides a strategic comfort zone vis-? -vis
China and Pakistan. If India continues to expand its
fissile material stockpile and receives U.S.
technological and material transfers, China??™s
willingness and incentive to maintain a freeze on its
own fissile material production may erode. This could
lead to intensified efforts by China to assist
Pakistan??™s weapons programs, to expand its own
arsenal, or both.

In the meantime, China??™s current nuclear capabilities,
stockpile, and arsenal gives it the edge over India.
If India maintains its stance of minimum deterrence,
it is unlikely to attempt to surpass China??™s nuclear
strength. Instead, U.S. nuclear assistance to India
has a greater potential for proliferation ricochet to
other countries. Among suppliers, Britain quickly
followed the U.S.-India joint statement in July by
announcing its decision to modify its own sanctions
against India in August.[25] Russia voiced its own
approval in September with its sights set on
legitimizing its nuclear trade with India and, by
extension, Iran.[26] After winning a deal to supply
India with 6 submarines and 43 Airbus planes, France
also acknowledged and pledged to work within the NSG
for ???full international cooperation with India in the
civilian nuclear field.???[27] Pakistan also staked its
own claim in September with its ambassador to the
United States, a former Army chief, stating that the
U.S. deal with India ???should leave the door open for
other countries that meet the same criteria.???[28] As
Iran, North Korea, and countless others witness
acceptance of and the benefits accrued by a country
that has rejected the NPT and tested nuclear weapons,
voluntary nuclear freezes on incipient nuclear weapons
programs or fissile material production may vanish for
more parties than just China.

Indigenization and Ballistic Missile Assistance

Dual-use space technology cooperation under the
India-U.S. joint statement will also help India
upgrade systems with military potential that were
originally established using U.S. and Russian
transfers as a base. As early as December 2001, the
U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) issued a
report that India could convert its Polar Space Launch
Vehicle (PSLV) into an intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) within a year or two.[29] In May 2003,
India launched its second Geostationary Satellite
Launch Vehicle (GSLV), hoisting a 1,800 kg payload,
the ???heaviest payload ever launched from Indian
soil.???[30]

India has demonstrated the technical ability in its
space program to domestically manufacture cryogenic
engines, develop solid-propelled missiles for more
rapid deployment, deliver significant payloads, and
create staged missiles for longer-range ballistic
missile launches. These advances do not make future
U.S. assistance obsolete, rather they indicate a much
faster rate of absorption, reverse engineering, and
improvements if such technology is transferred. U.S.
supercomputer technology, which can be used in nuclear
weapon and missile design, is just one of the types of
transfers that promises to assist India??™s burgeoning
supercomputer industry.[31]

Under Phase I of the NSSP, by the end of 2004, the
United States has already agreed to provide India??™s
Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics with a Cray XD1
supercomputer, equipped with 96 computer processors
capable of over 422 billion calculations per
second.[32] In April 2005, India??™s Tata Institute of
Fundamental Research (TIFR) also announced a
partnership with U.S. company Hewlett Packard to
implement High Performance Computing (HPC) solutions
at its Computational Mathematics Laboratory (CML).[33]
In any number of technologies relating to space and
nuclear programs, the United States can offer India
technology relating to computer simulations, as well
as missile launch, staging, guidance, and range.

Beyond hypothetical developments and rhetoric, in
September 2004, the United States removed India??™s
Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) from the
Department of Commerce Entity List.[34] By August
2005, the United States also removed several key ISRO
subsidiaries, including ISRO Telemetry, Tracking and
Command Network (ISTRAC), ISRO Inertial Systems Unit
(IISU), and Space Applications Center (SAC).[35] ISRO
as the parent organization is responsible for the
gamut of India??™s space launch vehicles that possess
the same technology as applied in ballistic missile
launch, guidance, and tracking. The three ISRO
subsidiaries focus on satellite technology, such as
high-resolution commercial imaging that can be used in
missile targeting accuracy and digital inertial
navigation systems that can be used in Post Boost
Vehicles (PBVs) to enhance ballistic missile accuracy
on reentry. U.S. fusion technology may also be applied
to super-conductive magnets employed in strategic
military developments in outer space and ballistic
missile defense. U.S. technology will contribute to a
space program that has tremendous military potential
not only in missile development, but also in the
weaponization of space.[36]

Ballistic Missile Impact on China

India is highly motivated to expand its missile
program, not only to counter threats from its
neighbors but also to strengthen its regional
competitiveness and boost its scientific and
international prestige. China poses a distant
strategic threat to India, while Pakistan??™s barrage of
tactical and strategic missile improvements keeps
India occupied in an immediate contest. Pakistan??™s
test of its nuclear-capable Babur cruise missile less
than a month after India announced mass production of
the Brahmos cruise missile is a recent example.[37]
Predictably, an Indian Defense Ministry official
stated that the Babur looks like a repainted Chinese
missile.[38] Prasun K. Sengupta has further alleged in
the magazine New Delhi Force that China's state-owned
China National Precision Machinery Import and Export
Corp (CPMIEC) transferred this technology to
Pakistan's state-owned National Development Complex
(NDC).[39] Bilateral Indo-Pakistani competition, which
India continues to view as fueled by China, has led
the two countries to advance their ballistic missile
ranges well beyond each others borders.[40]

One significant measure of India??™s missile program is
its ability to target Chinese cities. In April 1999,
India first test-fired its Agni-II, whose range of
more than 2,000 km[41] enables it to reach China??™s
ancient capital of Xi??™an. With a test launch of the
3,000-3,500 km-range Agni-III anticipated by the end
of 2005, India is rapidly approaching the range
necessary to reach China's capital Beijing with a
nuclear payload.[42] In spite of delays and concerns
over the speed of its missile development, such as
postponement of a test in 2003,[43] India appears
ready to make the next leap towards an Agni-III on the
basis of indigenous resources. And regardless of
pronouncements on Indian PSLV capabilities, the ICBM
dubbed Surya remains a source of mere speculation at
this stage.[44] U.S. assistance to India??™s space
program, especially in guidance and staging, could
play a critical role in enabling it to achieve the
next level of accuracy and range, and in acquiring
ICBM capabilities that would effectively start to
bring not only China but also the U.S. and its allies
into range.

3. India's Agni-II missile

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile Indigenization
and Assistance

U.S.-Indian cooperation in the transfer of
conventional military hardware and dual-use technology
also promises a boost to India??™s military
modernization. The Soviet Union traditionally
dominated this trade, providing India with Foxtrot
Class submarines in 1968 and a Charlie Class nuclear
powered submarine in 1988.[45] Russia continued this
trend throughout the 1990s and by April 2004,
concluded a lease agreement to supply India two
Akula-II class nuclear submarines.[46] Yet there have
been increasing reports of Russian submarine mishaps
and the quality of Russian naval vessels sold to India
has been less than optimal, with the aircraft carrier
Admiral Gorshkov requiring significant
retrofitting.[47] While still central, the Russian
Navy is rapidly becoming an outmoded supplier for
India??™s naval modernization.[48]

Currently, India has a total of approximately 15
submarines, 10 of them diesel-powered, known as the
EKM or Sindhu class. Among the missile systems, India
has sought to launch the short-range Sagarika or
Prithvi-III from a submarine base. Indian analysts
boast that the system will offer India a second strike
capability against Pakistan while serving as a
long-range nuclear deterrent. These analyses suggest
an expansion of missile range to 2,500 kilometers.[49]
A modest 300 km test in October 2004 suggests,
however, that the Sagarika has a long way to go before
developing into a long-range strategic nuclear
deterrent.[50] Since its inception in 1992, the
Sagarika missile program, like India??™s submarine
program, has suffered numerous delays.[51]

India??™s Sagarika and submarine programs could benefit
from U.S. conventional military equipment transfers
and space-related technology transfers, invigorating
India??™s pursuit of the final leg of its nuclear
triad.[52] However, aside from anticipated naval
drills and potential transfer of the outdated USS
Trenton,[53] there is little current indication of
U.S. support for India??™s naval programs. In naval
terms not much has changed from the Cold War. Although
a joint naval exercise is scheduled for late September
2005, U.S. naval sales continue to show a greater
inclination toward Pakistan, which is destined,
according to a September 2005 media report, to receive
two U.S. frigate warships and eight P-3C Orion Patrol
aircraft.[54] India remains dependent on Russian
assistance as with the Akula-II. The relative lack of
U.S. focus on India??™s naval development may
demonstrate that China is not the only country leery
of India??™s ability to dominate the Indian Ocean.

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile Impact on China

Of all the potential theaters for conflict, the Indian
Ocean is the most likely locus of Chinese, Indian and
U.S. contention.[55] India??™s Ministry of Defense
report of 2003-2004 pinpointed Chinese development of
a blue water navy, enhanced ties with India??™s
neighbors, and growing presence in the South China Sea
and Indian Ocean as emerging challenges.[56] Access to
sea lanes will grow in importance as competition
accelerates for oil and military and trade routes.
Deployment of a submarine-launched ballistic missile
(SLBM), especially an intermediate range one, would
assist India in gaining depth, flexibility, and
second-strike capability in its targeting of Pakistani
and Chinese territory. An SLBM could also play a
tactical role if short in range and conventional in
payload. Yet, India??™s nuclear submarine and Sagarika
program, which both began in the early 1990s, have
been slow in meeting the advancing demands of regional
development and security. The Sagarika has yet to
prove itself as a strategic deterrent with the range
to strike within China??™s borders.

Like India, China has been struggling with building
its own submarine fleet with reports of fire, leakage,
and accidents. China??™s submarine force currently
consists of four Kilo attack submarines from Russia,
an indigenous diesel Song attack submarine, five Han
nuclear attack submarines, and one nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarine known as the Xia.[57] The
U.S. Department of Defense in its Annual Report on the
Military Power of the People??™s Republic of China
suggests that China??™s next-generation nuclear
submarine programs are likely to receive a
???significant amount??? of Russian assistance.[58] By
contrast, India will have access to not only Russian
technology and equipment but also U.S., European, and
Middle Eastern sources. The delayed but
much-anticipated arrival of the Scorpene submarine
from France is just one example.[59] Even if the
European Arms Embargo on China were to be lifted,
China would continue to face U.S.-initiated obstacles
to suppliers.

4. Chinese submarine

Despite increased naval competition, India and China
are not necessarily on a collision course for
resources and access to shipping lanes in the Indian
Ocean. Chinese and Indian companies are already
partners in Sudan??™s Greater Nile Oil Project.[60] They
also plan to cooperate in a joint $4 billion oil
pipeline project with Iran following establishment in
April 2005 of a Joint Working Group for joint projects
in oil exploration and notification.[61] India and
China are also actively cooperating in regional energy
transport links. India??™s petroleum minister, Mani
Shankar Aiyar, following India??™s recent loss of a bid
to China for Kazakhstan??™s third-largest oil producer
PetroKazakhstan Inc. stressed the ???need for China and
India to adopt a collaborative approach in
bidding.???[62] China also has the incentive to
cooperate with India to avoid a ???Malacca Dilemma,???
through which India or another country blocks China??™s
access to oil imports from the Middle East and
Africa.[63] Indeed, India and China are expected to
sign memorandums of understanding in November 2005
focusing on oil exploration and development in the
Caspian Sea region, Central Asia, Africa and Latin
America on behalf of India's Oil and Natural Gas
Commission (ONGC) and the Indian Oil Corporation and
China??™s Sinopec, China National Petroleum Corporation,
and China National Offshore Oil Corporation
(CNOOC).[64] The agreements not only promise to
solidify their economic and resource cooperation but
indicate the expanded geographic reach of both
nations.

Sino-Indian Realities Versus Perceptions

United States conventional military cooperation,
combined with missile assistance in the guise of space
technology, has the potential to strengthen India??™s
quest for parity with China. In the near-term,
however, China is likely to dominate militarily. This
assessment is based on qualitative improvements and a
defense expenditure that is twice to four times that
of India??™s, depending on whether Chinese or U.S.
estimates are used.[65] Despite U.S. efforts to hinder
its military growth, China remains engaged in
extensive military modernization, with a declared
military budget of $29.9 billion for 2004.[66] China
has announced increases in military spending nearly
every year for more than a decade, with U.S. estimates
for China??™s modernization even higher. These advances,
in line with China??™s rapid economic growth, highlight
the difficulties that India will face should it seek
to ???catch-up??? to China.

Depending on which Chinese defense figure is used for
comparison, India??™s own growth in military spending,
while a strong 27 percent increase reaching
approximately $17.6 billion for the period from 2004
to 2005, is at best a little over half that of
China.[67] However, there is one area in which India
is rapidly gaining speed: procurement. According to an
August 2005 U.S. Congressional Research Service
report, India ranked first in the world in the value
of arms transfer agreements from all countries by $500
million between 1997 and 2004.[68] In 2004 alone,
India ranked first in this area among all developing
nations weapons purchasers, with $5.7 billion in such
agreements.[69] The U.S. is the world leader in arms
sales to developing nations with deliveries estimated
at $9.7 billion in 2004.[70] Even if India does not
buy U.S. wares, it enjoys the long-term negotiation
and planning leverage that China lacks. India??™s
nuclear and missile program quest for indigenization
has been supplemented by pursuit of supplier
diversification.

In spite of incitements to react, the Chinese
government response to the U.S.-Indian joint statement
and defense agreement of 2005 has been relatively
muted. China has focused more on threats posed by the
United States than those created by a well-armed or
technologically-advanced India. In fact, Chinese
popular and official media portray India as a
developing nation that has been duped by the United
States. The People??™s Daily cloaks its views behind
unnamed ???analysts??? (fenxizhe) to say that the
U.S.-Indian defense framework and joint statement have
expanded U.S. efforts to encircle and contain
China.[71] It also lambastes U.S. hypocritical
assistance to India, in light of U.S. tandem efforts
to convince Iran and North Korea to abandon their
nuclear programs and to pressure Europe to maintain
its arms embargo against China.[72]

China adds India to a long list of countries or
territories, including Taiwan, Japan, South Korea,
Kazakhstan, and Afghanistan, that have been
incorporated into expansive U.S. strategic, military
and economic frameworks directed toward containing
China. China??™s own policies of establishing regional
cooperative groups like the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) and its growing cooperative
relationships with ASEAN and Indian Ocean nations may
be understood in part as efforts to create patterns of
regional solidarity to forestall this perceived U.S.
encirclement. India??™s observer status in the SCO
combined with its attendance at August 2005
Sino-Russian military exercises, euphemistically
dubbed ???Peace Mission 2005,??? are indicative of Chinese
efforts at inclusive diplomacy, keeping its partners
close and potential adversaries even closer:
economically, politically, and increasingly
militarily.[73]

In 2003, China and India engaged in unprecedented
naval exercises as a major step toward military
confidence building measures at a time when they were
beginning to undertake joint energy programs.[74]
Articles on future Indian participation with China and
Russia in SCO military exercises also fuel speculation
of counterbalancing U.S. hegemony.[75] There is
abundant evidence that China seeks to strengthen its
economic, political, cultural, and even military ties
with India to pre-empt U.S. incorporation of yet
another state at its borders. Yet, India and China
also share concerns ranging from energy development to
trade in the Indian Ocean and elsewhere, suggesting
that the United States is significant but not the only
driving force in their desire to cultivate cooperation
over competition.

India has made a major strategic shift in its
perceptions of China, from the time when officials
such as former Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari
Vajpayee and former Defense Minister George Fernandes
cited China as the primary impetus behind India??™s
nuclear tests and Agni missile program.[76]
Recognizing the potentially adverse effects on
Sino-Indian economic and political relations, Indian
authors and politicians alike have been extremely
careful to emphasize that cooperation with the United
States does not target China. India??™s Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh has repeatedly stated variations of the
following: ???We see new horizons in our relations with
China. What we have done with the United States is not
at the cost of China or any other country.???[77]

At the same time, Indian authors are cautious not to
exaggerate the warming trend in Sino-Indian relations.
While Chinese articles tend to discount the threat
posed by India, for Indian strategic analysts China
remains a source of concern for perceived designs on
regional hegemony. The 1962 India-China conflict still
looms in the writings of many Indian analysts. The
litany of Indian articles on China??™s contributions to
Pakistan??™s Babur missile illustrates ongoing
perceptions of China using a regional proxy to
threaten India. India maintains a complex combination
of emulation and distrust when it comes to China.[78]
Emulation for China??™s rate of growth and ability as a
developing country to place itself on the geopolitical
map. Distrust over China??™s growing economic and
military strength, and expansive diplomacy, focused on
discussion of its ???real intentions???.[79] In addition
to the anticipated technological benefits gained from
cooperating with the United States, India seeks a
counterweight even as it pursues cooperative relations
with China.

China also serves as an asset for India in its efforts
to cultivate stronger relations and inducements from
the United States. U.S. relations with Pakistan and
historical assistance to its military programs during
the Cold War mark Indian perceptions of questionable
U.S. loyalties and unreliability. Even with the
economic and technological gains contained in the
joint statement with the United States, numerous
Indian articles lament that India??™s defense and arms
relationship with the United States is tantamount to
selling off the Indian Ocean, relinquishing its
nuclear autonomy, and constraining its future fissile
material production. India prides itself on preserving
its position as an independent actor and continues to
be acutely sensitive to discrimination or power
politics.[80] Continued Indian efforts to promote
multilateralism with China and Russia, while courting
the United States, suggests Indian wariness not only
towards China but also towards the United States.

Conclusion

For both China and the United States, cooperation with
India is emblematic of India??™s growing political,
economic and military strength. Among the many goals
of issuing a joint statement with India, the United
States may have designs on bolstering India vis-? -vis
China.[81] If this is the case, however, the effect
may prove to be the reverse. China has been pushed to
accelerate and expand its own incentives, in part, to
avoid United States entrenchment in another country on
its borders. Similarly, the United States is compelled
by China??™s actions to stifle any move toward a
Sino-Indian alliance or Sino-Indian-Russian
triangle.[82] In the midst of this array of
partnerships, India has been able to diversify its
political partners, just as it has diversified its
suppliers of technology.

China is but one factor in U.S. technological and
military engagement with India. Also present is the
realization that many of India??™s nuclear and missile
developments are already indigenous and increasingly
beyond U.S. control and sanctions. Concurrently, while
a technological innovator, India has also become one
of the largest recipients of foreign arms agreements
and transfers. The United States is faced with a
choice of participating as a supplier or running
interference as Russia, Israel, France and other
countries attempt to benefit from India??™s procurement
frenzy. Profit motive may be guiding the United States
as much if not more than the strategic considerations
involving China and regional hegemony.

Regardless of motive, the United States is
systematically removing licensing requirements on many
firms that contributed to India??™s nuclear weapons and
missile programs. Lifting of these sanctions combined
with the joint statement on dual-use technology can
only strengthen efforts by other countries defying
U.S. and international nonproliferation norms. U.S.
dual-use technology is also likely to contribute to
assisting India in realizing advanced fusion
technology for its nuclear weapons and advances in
targeting and staging for its missiles, placing the
United States and its allies in nuclear-capable
ballistic missile range. Even U.S. anticipation of
garnering enhanced Indian support for its agenda
abroad is diminished by India??™s long-standing
cooperation with Chinese and Russian multilateral
initiatives, most recently on Iran.

China and the United States have long engaged India??™s
adversaries, while demonstrating reluctance to form
strategic partnerships with India. Despite similar
early trajectories and lingering ties to Pakistan for
both countries, current Chinese and U.S. cooperation
with India is distinctly different. China has worked
to reduce tension with India by establishing a
relationship based on stronger cooperation in the
realms of trade, cultural exchange, and energy
exploration. Politically and economically, the United
States has also created inducements for closer
Sino-Indian cooperation. Yet, by making dual-use
transfers in nuclear and space technology the core of
the United States??™ other economic, political and
strategic inducements to India, the long-term
strategic price may be greater than the dollars or
short-term political leverage earned. The technology
and military hardware provided by the United States
promises to expand India??™s political, strategic and
military footprint even beyond China. U.S.
interference further strengthens China??™s incentives to
cooperate with India. Rather than pitting India
against China, the United States may be setting up
India to instead serve as a future strategic
counterweight to U.S. interests in Asia and abroad.

Notes:

[1] ???India??™s China Policy: Importance of a Strategic
Framework,??? in ???India Urged to Formulate ???Clear??™ China
Policy to Achieve Strategic Objectives,??? New Delhi,
Bharat Rakshak Monitor, FBIS SAP20050714000091, April
1, 2005.; ???The New Chapter of Relationship,??? in
???Editorial Lauds Growing India-China Friendship to
Counter US Dominance in Asia,??? New Delhi Rashtriya
Sahara, FBIS SAP20050413000025, April 13, 2005.
[2] Lu Yansong, ???Short-sighted Nuclear Deal,??? in ???PRC:
RMRB Article Views US-India ???Nuclear Deal,??™ US Plan to
Counter PRC with India, Japan,??? Beijing, Renmin Ribao,
FBIS CPP20050819000088, August 19, 2005.; ???RMRB Cites
Huanqiu Shibao Article on Washington Drawing India in
Against China,??? Beijing, Renmin Ribao, FBIS
CPP20050708000034, July 7, 2005.; Palash Kumar, ???AFP:
US Feting India to Balance Power in China-Dominated
Asia: Analysts,??? Hong Kong AFP, FBIS
JPP20050719000088, July 19, 2005.
[3] ???Full Text of Joint Statement of China, India,???
People??™s Daily Online, April 13, 2005, available at
http://64.233.187.104, accessed on August 13, 2005.;
???PM??™s Statement in the Lok Sabha on the Visits of
Chinese Premier and Pakistan President,??? Indian
Embassy, April 20, 2005, available at
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accessed on August 13, 2005.
[4] ???The Joint Communiqu?© of the Informal Meeting
Between the Foreign Ministers of the People??™s Republic
of China, the Russian Federation and the Republic of
India,??? Foreign Ministry of the People??™s Republic of
China, June 3, 2005, available at
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn, accessed on August 13, 2005.
[5] ???New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense
Relationship,??? United States Embassy, New Delhi-India,
June 28, 2005, available at
http://newdelhi.unembassy.gov/wwwhipr062905.html,
accessed on July 14, 2005.
[6] ???India - USA Joint Statement,??? Department of
Atomic Energy, Government of India, available at
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2005.
[7] Sharon Squassoni, ???U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with
India: Issues for Congress,??? Congressional Research
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[8] ???Unclassified Report to Congress on the
Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions,??? U.S.
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[9] ???Nuclear Power in India and China,??? World Nuclear
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46, August 12, 2005, p. A8.
[10] Sunil Saraf, ???Prime minister marks beginning of
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[11] ???BARC Commissions Integral Test Loop Facility for
AHWR: Banerjee,??? The Press Trust of India, April 12,
2005, available at http://www.lexis.com, accessed on
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October 24, 2003, available at http://www.lexis.com,
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[12] Estimates in the World Nuclear Association online
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[13] ???Thorium,??? Information and Issue Briefs, World
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on September 7, 2005.
[14] ???Advanced Nuclear Power Reactors,??? Nuclear Issues
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7, 2005.
[15] ???A ???Proliferation-Proof??™ Reactor???? NUKEM Market
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[16] David Albright and Kimberly Kramer, ???Separated
Civil Plutonium Inventories: Current Status and Future
Directions,??? Institute of Science and International
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Nonproliferation Policy Melts Down,??? The Weekly
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[17] Andre Gsponer and Jean-Pierre Hurni, ???ITER: The
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at http://www.tribuneindia.com, accessed on August 26,
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[18] ???India May Test Again Because H-Bomb Failed, U.S.
Believes,??? Nucleonics Week, Vol. 39, No. 48, November
26, 1998, pp. 1, 9, 10.
[19] ???Removal of License Requirements for Exports and
Reexports to India of Items Controlled Unilaterally
for Nuclear Nonproliferation Reasons and Removal of
Certain Indian Entities from the Entity List,??? Bureau
of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce,
Federal Register, Vol. 70, No. 167, August 30, 2005,
available at http://www.bxa.gov, accessed on August
30, 2005.
[20] ???BARC Commissions Integral Test Loop Facility for
AHWR: Banerjee,??? The Press Trust of India, April 12,
2005, available at http://www.lexis.com, accessed on
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[21] Aziz Haniffa, ???Deadly Arsenals: India, Pakistan
Can Have 110 Nuclear Bombs,??? India Abroad, Vol. 35,
No. 47, pp. A1, A7.; Joseph Cirincione, Jon B.
Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals ??“
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, Second
Edition, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, July 2005.
[22] ???Table 2 Plutonium and HEU Holdings by Country,
end 2003, in Tonnes,??? Global Stocks of Nuclear
Explosive Materials: Summary Tables and Charts,???
Institute for Science and International Security, July
22, 2005, Revised August 22, 2005.
[23] Ibid.
[24] ???Global nuclear stockpiles, 1945-2002,??? The
Atomic Scientists Bulletin, available at
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Threat Initiative, available at
http://www.nti.org/db/china/fmstock.htm, accessed on
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[25] ???Britain to ease nuclear sanctions against
India,??? Press Trust of India via India Info, August
11, 2005, available at
http://news.indiainfo.com/2005/08/11/1108uk-india-nuclear.html,
accessed on September 7, 2005.
[26] Abbas Razza Khan, ???Russia endorses nuclear pact
between US and India,??? Press Trust of India, September
16, 2005, available at http://www.india-defence.com,
accessed on September 16, 2005.
[27] ???France Backs India??™s Nuclear Energy Plans After
Winning Sub, Airbus Deal,??? Yahoo News, September 12,
2005, available at http://news.yahoo.com, accessed on
September 13, 2005.
[28] Foster Klug, ???Pakistan Wants Civilian Nuclear
Deal,??? The Associated Press via The Washington Post,
September 8, 2005, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com, accessed on September
8, 2005.
[29] ???Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic
Missile Threat Through 2015,??? National Intelligence
Estimate, National Intelligence Council, December
2001, available at
http://www.cia.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_otherprod/missilethreat2001.pdf,
accessed on August 11, 2005.
[30] K. S. Jayaraman, ???GSLV Launch Helps Move India
Closer To Self-Reliance in Space,??? Space News,
available at
http://209.73.219.100/spacenews/archive03/gslvarch_052003.html,
accessed on August 25, 2005.
[31] After delivery of Norwegian Norsk Data ND 100 and
ND 500 type computers between 1983 and 1984 and
arrival of a U.S. Cray XMP-14 supercomputer in 1987,
by September 2002 the Bhabha Atomic Research Center
(BARC) developed the ANUPAM-PIV 64-node supercomputer
with a speed of 43 giga flops. In 2003, India??™s Centre
for Development of Advanced Computing (C-DAC) went one
giant step further by developing the PARAM Padma which
has a speed of one teraflop, a trillion floating point
operations per second. "Norsk Data Computers Used in
Indian Nuclear Program,??? Oslo, Dagbladet, May 4, 1990,
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???India's BARC develops fastest supercomputer in the
country,??? Asia Pulse, September 16, 2002, available at
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P.K. Sinha, V.C.V. Rao, ???PARAM Padma ??“ A Teraflops
Computing System And High Performance Computing in
India,??? Centre for Development of Advanced Computing,
2003, available at
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[32] Indrani Bagchi, ???India hopes to get sanctions
revoked,??? Times of India, October 11, 2004, available
at
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/880726.cms,
accessed on September 11, 2005.; ???Foreign Secretary:
India Wants 'More Symmetrical Relationship' With US,???
Mumbai, The Times of India, October 11, 2004, FBIS
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[33] ???TIFR announces tie-up with HP,??? in ???India:
Pune-Base Supercomputer Param 1000 Announces Tie-Up
With Hewlett Packard,??? Chennai, Business Line, April
20, 2005, FBIS SAP20050421000073, accessed on August
30, 2005.
[34] ???Announcement on U.S.-India Next Steps in
Strategic Partnership,??? Bureau of Industry and
Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, September 2004,
available at
http://www.bis.doc.gov/News/2004/US-IndiaNextStep.htm,
accessed on February 16, 2005.
[35] ???Removal of License Requirements for Exports and
Reexports to India of Items Controlled Unilaterally
for Nuclear Nonproliferation Reasons and Removal of
Certain Indian Entities from the Entity List,??? Bureau
of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce,
Federal Register, Vol. 70, No. 167, August 30, 2005,
available at http://www.bxa.gov, accessed on August
30, 2005.
[36] Indian Air Force Chief Marshal, Srinivaspuram
Krishnaswamy stated as early as October 2003 that
India has begun ???conceptualizing??? space weapons
command systems and operational command. In November
2003 and again in December 2004, India made a
potentially significant step in this direction by
signing onto Russia??™s Global Navigation Satellite
System (GLONASS), a space platform that could be used
for improving the accuracy of its missile systems and
expansion into other weapons systems. ???IAF Working on
Weapon Platforms in Space,??? The Hindu, October 7,
2003, available at http://www.lexis.com, accessed on
August 24, 2005.; ???India Working on Space Weapons: IAF
Chief,??? The Press Trust of India, available at
http://www.rediff.com, accessed on August 29, 2005.;
???Memorandum of Understanding Between the Russian
Aviation and Space Agency and the Indian Space
Research Organization on Cooperation in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful
Purposes,??? The Embassy of the Russian Federation in
the Republic of India, November 11-13, 2003, available
at http://www.india.mid.ru/summits/01_07.html,
accessed on August 31, 2005.; ???India and Russia to
Revive Glonass,??? Flight International, December 14,
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August 30, 2005.
[37] Vivek Raghuvanshi, ???Pakistan??™s Missile Tests
Jolts India,??? Defense News, August 22, 2005, p. 50.
[38] Ranjit Kumar, ???China Gave ???Babar??™ to Pakistan,???
in ???India: US Military Expert Says Pakistani ???Babar??™
Missile Imported from China,??? New Delhi Navbharat
Times, FBIS SAP20050823000021, August 23, 2005, August
26, 2005.
[39] Prasun K. Sengupta, "Babur's Flight,??? in ???India:
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VII Cruise Missile,??? New Delhi Force, FBIS, September
9, 2005, SAP20050909000103, accessed on September 10,
2005.
[40] G. Parthasarathy, ???Cruise Missiles in
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Bharat Rakshak, August 29, 2005, available at
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2005.
[41] ???Proliferation: Threat and Response,??? Office of
the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense,
available at http://www.dod.gov, accessed on August
28, 2005, p. 24.; Amitabh Mattoo, ???Indian Agni-II
Missile Said Aimed at China,??? Calcutta The Telegraph,
available at http://www.lexis.com, accessed on August
25, 2005.
[42] Rahul Bedi, ???New Delhi Reveals Latest Schedule
for Missile Tests,??? Jane's Defense Weekly, November
12, 2003, p. 4
[43] ???Indian Defence News,??? New Delhi, Chanakya
Aerospace and Maritime Review, Vol. 31, No. 5, May 1,
2005, FBIS SAP20050623000018, accessed on August 15,
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the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense,
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28, 2005, p. 24.
[44] Press reports as early as 1999 suggest an
imminent test of India??™s ICBM. ???India to Test New
Long-Range Ballistic Missile: Official,??? AFX News
Limited, November 7, 1999, available at
http://www.lexis.com, accessed on August 25, 2005.;
???India: Ballistic Missiles Under Development,??? BBC
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http://www.lexis.com, accessed on August 25, 2005.
[45] Mark Gorwitz, ???The Indian Strategic Nuclear
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[46] ???Indian Military Bolstered by Foreign Purchases,
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at http://www.jinsa.org, accessed on September 7,
2005.
[47] ???No Gorshkov, but Accords Look to the Future,???
Times of India via Bharat-Rakshak, February 9, 2002,
available at http://www.bharat-rakshak.com, accessed
on September 7, 2005.
[48] ???Bellona To Seek Intl Action Over Sunken Russian
Sub,??? Moscow Interfax, FBIS CEP20050830950045, August
30, 2005.
[49] Vivek Raghuvanshi, ???Salvaging the Sagarika: India
Seeks Russian, Israeli Help in Missile Development,???
Asia and Pacific Rim, Defense News, February 21, 2005,
p. 14.
[50] T. S. Subramanian, ???Prithvi-III Test Fired for
First Time,??? The Hindu, October 28, 2004, available at
http://www.lexis.com, accessed on August 11, 2005.
[51] Rahul Roy-Chaudry, ???India-Defense: India
Developing Sea-Based Missile System,??? IPS-Inter Press
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???N-Submarine Project Yet to Take Off,??? The Hindu,
October 28, 1998, available at http://www.lexis.com,
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[52] ???New Army ???Doctrine??™ Ready for Release,??? India,
The Statesman, October 24, 2004, available at
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[53] ???Navy: Busy Year of War Games Ahead,??? in ???Indian
Navy to Join War Games with US, Russia, France,??? New
Delhi, The Asian Age, July 5, 2005, FBIS,
SAP20050715000020, accessed on September 7, 2005.;
Shashank Sinha, ???Indian Navy Interested in USS
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Trenton??™ May Be ???Great Asset??™ for Navy,??? New Delhi,
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[54] ???Talks with India Remained Warm for Six Months,
Now There is Chilliness: Chief of Naval Staff,??? in
???Pakistan Gets 8 P-3C Orion Aircraft, Two Frigates
from US; CNS Lauds US Help,??? Rawalpindi, Nawa-e Waqt,
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[55] China is not the only concern of Indian
strategists charting developments in the Indian Ocean.
The U.S. driven Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI), under which illicit transfers are interdicted
during shipment, has also come under scrutiny. A
number of Indian critics have expressed concern that
the United States is manipulating their partnership to
gain ???back door entry??? into the Indian Ocean for the
PSI, which many deem as already on shaky legal ground
given Part VII of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea. India??™s own reluctance to fall in line with
the United States has been made particularly evident
with the omission of PSI from the Indo-U.S. joint
statement and India??™s refusal to join August 2005
U.S.-organized multinational PSI naval exercises in
Southeast Asia. Seema Mustafa, ???India Surrenders Ocean
to US,??? in ???India Said to Surrender Ocean to US in
Defense Pact,??? New Delhi, The Asian Age, FBIS
SAP20050706000017, July 2, 2005.; Ranjit Kumar, ???India
Did Not Join the PSI Military Exercise,??? in India
Stays Away from Joint Naval Exercise to Monitor
Illegal Arms Transport,??? New Delhi, Navbharat Times,
August 17, 2005, FBIS SAP20050817000023, accessed on
September 7, 2005.
[56] ???Annual Report ??“ 2003-2004,??? Ministry of Defence,
Government of India, available at
http://mod.nic.in/reports/MOD-English2004.pdf,
accessed on August 15, 2005.
[57] ???The Military Power of the People??™s Republic of
China,??? A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National
Defense Authorization Act Fiscal Year 2005, Office of
the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense,
2005, pp. 23, 24, 33.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Rajat Pandit, ???Wait For Scorpene May Soon Be
Over,??? The Times of India, March 16, 2005, available
at http://www.lexis.com, accessed on August 11, 2005.
[60] ???China, India Seek Cooperation in Global Oil
Quest,??? Embassy of the People??™s Republic of China in
India, April 4, 2005, available at
http://www.chinaembassy.org, accessed on August 15,
2005.
[61] ???India, China to Set Up Joint Group to Forge Oil
Cooperation Deals,??? New Delhi, The Press Trust of
India, August 9, 2005, FBIS SAP20050809000099,
accessed on August 10, 2005.
[62] Penny Macrae, ???AFP: India Says China Oil
Cooperation at Early Stage,??? Hong Kong Agence France
Presse, August 26, 2005, FBIS JPP20050826000017,
available at http://www.lexis.com, accessed on August
26, 2005.; ???China Beats India to Acquire
PetroKazakhstan,??? New Delhi, The Press Trust of India,
August 22, 2005, FBIS SAP20050822000064, available at
http://www.lexis.com, accessed on August 26, 2005.
[63] ???The Military Power of the People??™s Republic of
China,??? A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National
Defense Authorization Act Fiscal Year 2005, Office of
the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense,
2005, p. 33.
[64] ???India says China oil cooperation at early stage,
will still compete,??? Agence France Presse, August 26,
2005, available at http://www.yahoo.com, accessed on
August 31, 2005.
[65] ???The Military Power of the People??™s Republic of
China,??? A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National
Defense Authorization Act Fiscal Year 2005, Office of
the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense,
2005, pp. 21, 22.
[66] Ibid.
[67] ???Defense Expenditure, 2004-2005,??? Ministry of
Defense, Government of India, available at
http://mod.nic.in/aboutus/body.htm#as6, accessed on
September 8, 2005.
[68] Richard F. Grimmett, ???Conventional Arms Transfers
to Developing Nations, 1997-2004,??? Congressional
Research Service Report for Congress, August 29, 2005,
available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/52179.pdf,
accessed on September 9, 2005.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Ibid.
[71] ???Mei Dui Yin Kaiqi He Da Men ??“ Yu Lianhe Yindu
Ezhi Zhongguo Fazhan,??? (The United States Opens the
Nuclear Door to India ??“ In a Desire to Contain China??™s
Growth), People??™s Daily, July 20, 2005, available at
http://www.people.com.cn, accessed on August 14, 2005.
[72] ???Mei Yin He Hezuo Shi Yi Zhao Xianqi Hai Shi Yiji
Miaozhao???? (Is Nuclear Cooperation between the United
States and India a Dangerous or Clever Chess Move?),
CCTV.com, July 21, 2005, available at
http://bbs.cctv.com.cn, accessed on August 14, 2005.;
???Mei Dui Yin Kaiqi He Da Men ??“ Yu Lianhe Yindu Ezhi
Zhongguo Fazhan,??? (The United States Opens the Nuclear
Door to India ??“ In a Desire to Contain China??™s
Growth), People??™s Daily, July 20, 2005, available at
http://www.people.com.cn, accessed on August 14, 2005.
[73] ???Indian Defence Officials Watch China-Russia
Military Exercises,??? New Delhi, The Press Trust of
India, FBIS SAP20050823000109, August 23, 2005,
available at http://www.lexis.com, accessed on August
26, 2005.
[74] ???Zhong Yin Nengyuan Xuqiu Zengjia Tiaozhan
Meiguo???? (Will China and India??™s Energy Needs Increase
the Challenge to the United States?), Muzi News,
Latelinenews.com, August 12, 2005, available
http://latelinenews.com/ll/chinese/1374352.shtml,
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???China, India Conduct Joint Naval Exercise,??? The
Associated Press, The Washington Post, November 14,
2003, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com,
accessed on November 14, 2003.
[75] ???Zhong Yin E Goujian Zhanlue Sanjiao ??“ Xin Anquan
Guanzhu Daoxia Chuanmian Hezuo,??? (China, India, and
Russia Build a Strategic Triangle ??“ Their New Concept
of Security Spans All Areas) Army News, Tom.com, June
10, 2005, available at
http://army.news.tom.com/1019/1021/2005610-37971.html,
accessed on August 14, 2005.; ???Russia-China-India
Maneuvers May Be Held in 2006,??? Moscow, Agentstvo
Voyennukh Novostey, August 26, 2005, FBIS
CEP20050826027004, accessed on August 26, 2005.
[76] George Perkovich, India??™s Nuclear Bomb ??“ The
Impact on Global Proliferation, University of
California Press, Berkeley, 1999.
[77] ???India, United States Not Ganging Up Against
China, Indian PM,??? Agence France Presse, August 3,
2005, available at http://news.yahoo.com, accessed on
August 15, 2005.; ???India, US Ink Pact for
Comprehensive Defence Cooperation,??? The Press Trust of
India, June 29, 2005, available at
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[78] Sheela Bhatt, ???The Big Question: Can Singh
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[79] Dr. Subhash Kapila, ???China-India Strategic
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Lora Saalman is a Research Associate at the Wisconsin
Project on Nuclear Arms Control. Her analyses have
appeared in the online journals of the Power and
Interest News Report, the Nuclear Threat Initiative,
the Monterey Institute of International Studies, and
the Center for Nonproliferation Studies. She wrote
this article for Japan Focus. The views expressed in
this article do not necessarily reflect those of the
Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. Posted
September 21, 2005.

ISSN: 1557-4660
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