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[1] From: Parvez Jamasji <parvez1942@yahoo.com> Date: Wed Sep 28, 2005 8:38am Subject: Re: [indiathinkersnet] Google software exposes IAF bases The point is NOT about Broad Band, it is about our "" Official Secrets "" they are all over the World, . Guarding secrets - corruption - will soon be IMPOSSIBLE or that much more difficult, MERCIFULLY. Our Neta - Babus - Thekedars will suddenly be UNEMPLOYED. Thanks for your time Best Wishes Parvez Jamasji . indiathinkersnet@yahoogroups.com wrote: Google software exposes IAF bases CHARLES ASSISI TIMES NEWS NETWORK[ TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 2005 MUMBAI: Legally, you aren't supposed to come within arm's length of India's military bases. Whether it is the naval dockyards in Mumbai or the air force bases in New Delhi, Bangalore and Hyderabad, they continue to be strictly out of bounds for unauthorised personnel -------------------- [2] From: rkurian1@vsnl.com Date: Wed Sep 28, 2005 Subject: India Fails the Test in IAEA.. http://www.truthout.org/docs_2005/092805O.shtml India Fails the Test in IAEA By J. Sri Raman t r u t h o u t | Perspective Wednesday 28 September 2005 It has happened sooner - and in a much worse manner - than many in India had hoped. The country has made its most brazen overture thus far to the George Bush regime. And it has done so on an issue that pits it against the cause of world peace and the comity of poor nations. In these columns before, we talked of the test that awaited India - and Pakistan - in the meeting of the board of governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna on September 19. There was a fair chance then that India would not fail the test so ignominiously and immediately. Even Washington seemed anxious to allay such fears. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had been so understanding as to assure India and others that the decision she wanted the IAEA to take could be deferred. An IAEA resolution to refer Iran's nuclear issue to the United Nations Security Council, she conceded ever so condescendingly, "need not be passed on September 19 itself." It was not. The resolution was adopted on September 22, and the delay made no difference to either Iran or India. New Delhi was denied the opportunity even to pretend that it had taken time for Washington and its Western friends in the IAEA to tame it. Reports that the Indian government had decided quite some time earlier to vote with the US, even while claiming to be an advocate of "diplomacy" as against a diktat on the issue, proved remarkably correct. India was one of the 22 member-states of the board to vote for the resolution moved by the EU3 (the UK, France and Germany) with the mighty support of the US. The resolution was clearly for a referral of Iran to the UN Security Council, with repercussions that should be easily comprehensible after the Iraq experience. The pro-US media pundits in India, who had mournfully predicted an Indian abstention on the issue, were pleasantly surprised. It was not only that India was not one of the 12 abstainers. More sadly and significantly, the majority of the abstainers belonged to the developing world and non-alignment movement. More shamefully, for those Indians proud of their country's record of relative independence in international relations, the abstainers included Pakistan, with the stigma of a satellite of the US through successive military regimes in Islamabad. Pakistan's abstention, actually, was as un-mysterious as India's support for the resolution. India's stand had been anticipated right from the conclusion of the nuclear deal in July between Bush and India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Pakistan's stand has followed from President Pervez Musharraf's failure to strike a similar deal with Washington. General Musharraf, in a post-IAEA plaint, has lamented the US abandonment of an ally of Afghan-war vintage, accompanied by strategic partnership with India of the erstwhile "enemy camp." A similar turnaround may be seen in relations between India and Iran, whom a concern over the Taliban threat during the Afghan war brought together. These, however, are minor twists of history, compared to the major shift that India's vote in the IAEA signified. Predictably, the vote has elicited sharp political reactions in India. The Left has been loud and clear in its denunciation of the government's unwarranted and democratically unauthorized departure from the country's tested and proven foreign policy. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which had initiated the policy of "strategic partnership" with the US and had even extended a welcome to Bush's missile defense program, has joined the chorus of protest. Predictably, too, the government has come out with its counterpropaganda. Its contrived and contradictory explanations, however, have not convinced or reassured any of the concerned quarters. New Delhi's protestations about its vote as a "diplomatic?® magic wand, waved in Vienna with the sole purpose of saving Iran from an immediate wave of Western wrath, have found no takers in Teheran. From Iran comes, today, the unhappy tiding that "economic cooperation" with countries voting for the resolution stands severely endangered. Some reports, in fact, suggest that Teheran has already decided to call off the $5-million-a-day liquefied natural gas (LNG) export deal with India reached in June. New Delhi has also asserted that the vote marked no departure from its non-alignment policy. Reacting to the resolution in diplomatically restrained terms, however, NAM leader and Malaysian member of the IAEA board Ryma Jamal Hussein said: "... NAM's major concerns and those of other like-minded states were not taken on board." The Singh government has claimed repeatedly to have bought time for beleaguered Iran. The movers of the resolution, however, allowed that country a grace time only until November 2005. Not many believe in New Delhi's capacity to work a magical change in US-Iran relations in a mere month's time. Few have faith, either, in the capacity of public opinion and, more importantly, political pressure from the Left (which backs the Singh government from outside in order to keep the BJP out) to reverse the shift in India-US relations. Another test awaits India - and not Pakistan this time - in the next IAEA meeting in November. Will it vote, by implication, for another Iraq-type violation of international law? The answer is hardly reassuring. Judging, at least, by the way India is already conducting itself as a member of the "nuclear club," a nuclear-weapon state lecturing Iran and others on non-proliferation. A freelance journalist and a peace activist of India, J. Sri Raman is the author of Flashpoint (Common Courage Press, USA). He is a regular contributor to t r u t h o u t. ---------------------------------- [3] From: Regi P George <george_regi@yahoo.com Date: Wed Sep 28, 2005 Subject: Re: [Mahajanapada] Has the UPA Govt committed suicide?? What about Quba? What about Hugo Schavez of Venezuela? Should they also keep quiet against a moron? The only way you can defeat this imperialism is to intensify your struggle more. Your silence will kill you and Indian stand prooved what is the outlook of our precious de-politicalised leadership. Pandit Nehru and Nasar stood together to build a non-alignment movement not in a world of free, secuar and peacefull atmospher. It was the time Nasar build up Egypt and Arab heros against the zionists and imperialism to nationalise Zues canal. Nasar and Nehru live for hundred thousand years as heros but manmohan, vajpey and bush goes back to the garbage boxes of history. Those who try to deviate, molest and abuse the history trying to get into the history but the one who make the path proper and organise the flow of history become part of history. Gandhi and Luther King become History but Manmohan and Bush will not be a part of history. regi ggjey <ggjey@... wrote: But it was a wise decision. Iran will not lose anything because of India's stand. But if India sided with Iran, US would have felt offended and we would have lost the nuclear treaty. Now we keep the US in good humor. Iran's positin remains as it is. but I dont know why Iran provokes the US like the Iraq, when it has no power to resist an attack. The crazy regime in DC wants some pretext to deal with Iran and destabilize the entire Middle East. In such a situation, a wise government will keep quiet. Joseph g --- rkurian1@... wrote: This was obviously written before we actually committed suicide based on flimsy promises that we don't even need.. I do hope all of you read the strong editorial in the Hindu of Sep 26. India has lost all the advantages it has had all these years by remaining in the Non-aligned block of the world. What an idiotic and disastrous decision..!! (I know that is not parliamentary language!!!) What is the point of being an economically strong nation if we still think we have to betray friends like Iran for not-so-friendly and undependable countries in the west? Shame on us.. Just watched a commentary on CNN World where a Muslim analyst based in London commented on the great shock the Iranians had, seeing India voting against it. If we had abstained, not wanting to throw our weight anywhere, it wouldn't have hurt so much. I do hope the Left takes it up and tells the Congress that they won't stand for this nonsense. Maybe we do need mid-term elections.. (No, I am not a communist!) --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Iran's shadow over India-US relations By Ethirajan Anbarasan BBC News The newly strengthened India-US relations seem to be overshadowed by Delhi's insistence on using diplomacy to resolve the Iranian nuclear controversy. At the current board meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, the United States, Germany, France and Britain are lobbying hard to report Iran to the UN Security Council for its nuclear activities. Diplomats say they have distributed a draft resolution to the board and it is expected to be voted on later this week. However, the US-led initiative may not have the required majority as countries like Russia, China and India have expressed their reservations over referring the Iran issue to the Security Council. India cannot sit on the fence anymore. It may have to make a choice. Either way it is going face problems Professor P R Kumarasamy, Jawaharlal Nehru University India, whose support for the resolution is considered to be crucial, wants to give more time for Tehran and use diplomacy to resolve the nuclear controversy. Precarious situation But Americans seem to have been taken aback by New Delhi's stance. "If New Delhi decides to vote against the resolution that would definitely put obstacles at least in the nuclear deal signed in July 2005," says Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Washington-based Non-proliferation Policy Education Centre. After decades of mutual suspicion during the Cold War, India and the US signed a landmark nuclear deal in July. The pact allows Washington for the first time to help India's civilian nuclear programme, even though India is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In addition to the nuclear deal, the two countries have also agreed to cooperate in defence and space programmes. India felt its ties with the US had entered a new phase. But the Iran issue has come as a jolt to both sides. Earlier this month the Bush administration came under strong criticism from some members of the US Congress for the proposed nuclear deal, which requires the Congressional approval. Congressmen expressed anger over India's apparent support for Iran's nuclear programme. Now New Delhi is in a precarious situation. After obtaining nuclear weapon capability in 1974, India may not have the moral right to ask Iran to give up its nuclear ambitions. But at the same time, it cannot afford to risk the ire of the US and the European Union by siding with Iran. The reality for India is that it is struggling to meet its energy demands. It currently imports 70% of the crude oil it needs and its energy demands, both in oil and gas, are expected to double by 2020 as the country's economy grows rapidly. Gateway India needs energy-rich countries like Iran. Earlier this year, Iran and India signed a $22bn deal for Tehran to supply five million tonnes of gas a year to India. The proposed gas pipeline project is expected to come through Pakistan. For months, Washington has been conducting behind the scenes diplomacy with India, urging it to rethink such ambitious projects with Iran. So far, Delhi has not given in to the US pressure. Analysts say that India-Iran relations have been steadily evolving over the years. A declaration in January 2003 clearly states the intentions of the two countries for a strategic partnership. In that sense, India's current position should not come as a surprise. Nevertheless, India's options seem to be extremely limited. "India cannot sit on the fence anymore. It may have to make a choice. Either way it is going face problems," says Professor P R Kumarasamy of the Jawaharlal Nehru University in Delhi. With nuclear power accounting for only 2.7% of its total energy production, India has more reasons to side with Iran as nuclear deals with the US is not expected to meet its requirement in the near future. The India-Iran partnership goes beyond the proposed gas pipeline. India has the second largest Shia population in the world and improving ties with Iran could send encouraging signals for the nearly 20 million Shias in the country. The two countries have also been stepping up their military co-operation and Delhi is keen to have a foothold in Afghanistan using Iran as an entry point. If a key planned land route to Afghanistan is completed, Iran could be India's gateway to the land-locked Central Asian countries. Also, any decision to side with the US could undermine India's position amongst Non-Aligned and other developing countries. Politically this could be a risky venture for the Indian coalition government as some of the members of the coalition have raised strong objections to the idea. Story from BBC NEWS: http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/south_asia/4263730.stm ------------------------- [4] From: Sukla Sen <suklasen@yahoo.com> Date: Wed Sep 28, 2005 Subject: The United States, China, and India: A Story of Leaders, Partners, and Clients http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/819 FPIF Commentary The United States, China, and India A Story of Leaders, Partners, and Clients By Zia Mian | September 27, 2005 Editor: John Gershman, IRC The past few months have seen important developments in relations between the United States and India. Much of the commentary has focused resolutely and rightly on the wisdom and possible consequences of the new agreements on military and nuclear policy and programs. But these recent agreements need also to be seen in the light of the more than 50 years of U.S. efforts to have India become a part of American political, strategic, and economic plans for Asia. What becomes clear is how difficult this proved to be over the years. It begs the question why Indian leaders have finally started to fall in step so easily in the past few years. Cold War Era The first efforts by the United States to co-opt India into its strategic ambitions came soon after independence. The U.S. goal was to have India join the U.S. side in the Cold War against the Soviet Union and, in time China. The pattern was set during Jawaharlal Nehru??™s visit to the United States in 1949, which followed on the heels of the first nuclear test by the Soviet Union and the success of the Chinese communists in seizing power. Robert J. McMahon, a historian of U.S. diplomacy toward South Asia records in his book The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan, that before Nehru??™s visit, the CIA and the State Department argued that India was the only potential regional power that could ???compete with Communist China for establishing itself as the dominant influence in Southeastern Asia.??? Nehru was feted during his trip. But the notion that India could serve as a lever for U.S. policy toward China, and more broadly in Asia, came to naught. Speaking to the United States, Nehru was clear??”India needed help, but not at any cost??”he said: ???We shall ??¦ gladly welcome such aid and cooperation on terms that are of mutual benefit. We believe that this may well help in the solution of the larger problems that confront the world. But we do not seek any material advantage in exchange for any part of our hard-won freedom.??? He explained his refusal to cooperate on his return home, saying that ???they expected something more than gratitude and goodwill and that more I could not supply them.??? For its part, after Nehru left, the U.S. National Security Council noted ???the current reluctance of the area to align itself overtly with any power bloc??? and determined that ???it would be unwise for us to regard South Asia, more particularly India, as the sole bulwark against the extension of Communist control in Asia.??? Pakistan, on the other hand, was happy to accept a role in U.S. plans for South Asia. It built an enduring relationship with the United States, starting in 1954. The United States provided economic and military aid, and Pakistan provided military bases, prepared to be the frontline in a possible war with the Soviet Union, and supported the United States in international fora. The U.S. tried again, during the early 1960s, under President Kennedy. Even before becoming president, he had argued that the United States and its western allies put together a package of aid and support ???designed to enable India to overtake the challenge of Communist China.??? As president, he sought to put together such a package. But U.S. efforts to enlist India in support of U.S. policies and in particular, the effort to counter China, were frustrated. When Kennedy and Nehru met in 1961, they apparently clashed over Vietnam and nuclear disarmament among other things, and it is suggested that ???particularly frustrating to U.S. officials was Nehru??™s refusal to accept the mantle of leadership in Southeast Asia.??? Recently declassified reports from May 1963 reveal that President Kennedy and his aides considered whether and how the United States might support India in case there was another China-India war. The defense secretary Robert McNamara argued that ???Before any substantial commitment to defend India against China is given, we should recognize that in order to carry out that commitment against any substantial Chinese attack, we would have to use nuclear weapons.??? The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Maxwell Taylor, worried about the long-term and ???the overall problem of how to cope with Red China politically and militarily in the next decade.??? Kennedy took the position that ???We should defend India, and therefore we will defend India.??? Nuclear Policy Nuclear weapons figured prominently in other ways. In 1964, amid American concerns about China??™s first nuclear weapons test, George Perkovich has documented how senior officials in the State Department and the Pentagon went so far as to consider offering ???the possibilities of providing nuclear weapons under U.S. custody??? to India. Perkovich reveals that the plan envisaged helping India modify aircraft to drop nuclear weapons, training crews, providing dummy weapons for practice runs, and information on the effects of nuclear weapons for use in deciding targets. At the same time, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission was considering helping India with ???peaceful nuclear explosions,??? which would involve the use of U.S. nuclear devices under U.S. control being exploded in India. It was not just the Americans who thought this way. Homi Bhabha, the founder and head of the Department of Atomic Energy, in 1965 urged the United States to give India a nuclear device or just the blueprints for one to help it catch up with China??™s nuclear development. But his plans came to naught. Increasingly bogged down in Vietnam and worried that its future wars in the Third World would be even more difficult if nuclear weapons continued to spread, the United States decided that it preferred instead to stem the spread of nuclear weapons. It joined with the Soviet Union, which had similar worries, in crafting a nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The treaty was negotiated in 1968 and came into force in 1970. At the same time, the United States began to improve its relations with China. India??™s 1974 nuclear test further eroded hopes of a U.S.-India nuclear relationship as a new regime of non-proliferation restrictions took shape. Post-Cold War Era As the Cold War ended, the United States determined that no other power would be allowed to emerge as a potential rival. The now infamous 1992 draft Defense Planning Guidance prepared by Paul Wolfowitz, the under-secretary of defense for policy for Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, that was leaked to the press declared ???Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power.??? In particular, it noted ???we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.??? In other words, the geopolitical order must be stabilized and the United States maintain its relative superiority not just globally, but even in the different regions of the world. China again became the focus of attention as it increasingly became a major economic and political force in international affairs. This time story was to be different. India had new leaders. Vajpayee and the BJP have long believed that Nehru was mistaken to pursue non-alignment in the Cold War and have argued that India should have made common cause with the United States against Communism and against China. This was particularly clear in the May 1998 letter Vajpayee wrote to President Clinton justifying India??™s nuclear tests, with the first point being China??”the ???overt nuclear weapon state on our borders, a state which committed armed aggression against India??? and claiming that ???an atmosphere of distrust persists.??? This was despite important breakthroughs such as Chinese president Jiang Zemin??™s visit to India in 1996 and the signing of an agreement on confidence-building measures along the so-called ???line of actual control??? in the border areas. This built on an earlier 1993 agreement on ???Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility??? in the disputed border areas. The new direction in U.S.-India relations became clear in March 2000, when President Clinton visited India. The joint statement that he issued with Prime Minister Vajpayee noted that ???There have been times in the past when our relationship drifted without a steady course. As we now look toward the future, we are convinced that it is time to chart a new and purposeful direction in our relationship.??? This new direction for the U.S.-India relationship was described as one in which: ???In the new century, India and the United States will be partners in peace, with a common interest in and complementary responsibility for ensuring regional and international security. We will engage in regular consultations on, and work together for, strategic stability in Asia and beyond.??? The shared goal of ???strategic stability in Asia??? can be read as India finally accepting U.S. ideas about what should be the relative balance of power in Asia, and in particular, U.S. concerns that a rising China could in time constrain the exercise of U.S. power. New Direction The ???new direction??? identified in Clinton??™s March 2000 visit was taken up concretely in the ???Next Steps in Strategic Partnership??? agreement of January 2004. This announced that the United States and India would ???expand cooperation??? in civilian nuclear activities, civilian space programs, and high-technology trade, as well as on missile defense. It is worth pointing out the obvious, namely, that cooperation in this context is a euphemism for the United States providing India access to aid, information, and technology in these areas. The U.S. officials have made clear the purpose of this agreement. A senior official announced that ???Its goal is to help India become a major world power in the 21st century ??¦ We understand fully the implications, including military implications, of that statement.??? The deputy State Department spokesman explained further that the United States was ready to ???help India??? with command and control, early warning and missile defense, and noted that ???Some of these items may not be as glamorous as combat aircraft, but I think for those of you who follow defense issues you??™ll appreciate the significance.??? Former senior U.S. officials and countless strategic commentators have pointed out the inference that is to be drawn from the new U.S. effort to ???help India.??? Robert Blackwill, who served in the Bush administration as U.S. ambassador to India and then as a deputy national security adviser for strategic planning, has wondered, for instance, ???Why should the United States want to check India??™s missile capability in ways that could lead to China??™s permanent nuclear dominance over democratic India???? It is against this background that one should read the joint statement by President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of July 18, 2005. The statement has the two leaders ???declare their resolve to transform the relationship between their countries and establish a global partnership??? and explains that this partnership will ???promote stability, democracy, prosperity, and peace throughout the world.??? The agreement aims, it says, to ???enhance our ability to work together to provide global leadership.??? It is clear who will lead and who will follow. Zia Mian is a Pakistani physicist with the Program on Science and Global Security at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University and a frequent contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus (online at www.fpif.org). This report is a slightly revised version of an article published in Economic and Political Weekly on September 10, 2005. For More Information Feeding the Nuclear Fire By Zia Mian and M.V. Ramana (September 20, 2005) http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/659 Sixty Years Without Nuclear War By Zia Mian, R. Rajaraman and Frank von Hippel (August 22, 2005) http://presentdanger.irc-online.org/pd/363 Unraveling of the U.S. Military By Zia Mian (August 22, 2005) http://presentdanger.irc-online.org/pd/375 A New American Century? By Zia Mian (May 4, 2005) http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2005/0505amcent.html U.S.-Russian Lessons for South Asia By Zia Mian, R. Rajaraman, and Frank von Hippel (August 2, 2002) http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2002/0208nukelessons.html Nuclear War in South Asia By Matthew McKinzie, Zia Mian, M.V. Ramana, and A.H. Nayyar (June 2002) http://www.fpif.org/papers/nuclearsasia.html |
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| << September26, 2005 - [India Thinkers Net]Digest 27th sept |
September29, 2005 - [India Thinkers Net]Global warming,Persian puzzle,Countercrruents etc >> |
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