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Wishing all thinkers a Happy and Prosperous New Year. the.moderator INDIA THINKERS NET -------------------------------------------------------- [1] From: Sukla Sen <suklasen@yahoo.com> Date: Sat Dec 31, 2005 Subject: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons The Economic and Political Weekly December 10, 2005 Reviews TALL CLAIM, LITTLE EVIDENCE Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons by Sumit Ganguly and Devin Hagerty; Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2005; pp 223, Rs 495. M V Ramana In the 1921 film, The Kid, Charlie Chaplin plays a window repairman with a partner in business ??“ Jackie Coogan, who plays the Kid. Their modus operandi is that Coogan goes around breaking windows and Chaplin comes by a few minutes later with a selection of window glass, as if by accident, and gets hired to fix them. To those who do not catch on to what is happening, it would seem that Chaplin is indeed a saviour. According to Sumit Ganguly and Devin Hagerty in Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons, nuclear weapons play a role in south Asia that is, in many ways, similar to Chaplin??™s role. What is left out, however, is an examination of how the same nuclear weapons also play the role essayed by Coogan. Before one examines why this is the case, a brief summary of the book is in order. Ganguly and Hagerty attempt to come up with a ???comprehensive analysis of Indo-Pakistani crisis behaviour in south Asia??™s nuclear era??¦comprehensive in the sense of covering all of the crises, major and minor???. The authors consider six crises between 1984 and 2002. All but one of these were resolved without war; the exception is Kargil, 1999. The authors then go on to ask: why have these six crises been resolved short of major war? The answer sought to this question is purely within the ambit of their chosen theoretical perspective on international relations: realism. Realism, by and large, leaves out domestic factors in its explanations. According to realists, states are obsessed with maximising their ???security???, defined almost exclusively in military terms. Within this narrow perspective, the authors examine three possible strands of explanation: unipolarity theory, nuclear deterrence theory and conventional deterrence theory. The authors conclude that ???the nuclear-deterrence proposition provides the strongest explanation for the absence of major war in the region over the last two decades, especially in the four crises beginning with that of 1990. US intervention in the form of crisis management sometimes played a secondary, but important, role??? (p 11). For a book that promises so much, Fearful Symmetry falls very short. The problems with it start early ??“ as soon as the authors state their three propositions to be tested (pp 8-10), each of which starts with the fundamental but flawed assumption, that the Indian and Pakistani governments had ???compelling incentives to attack one another during the crises under examination???. If one were to examine each of these crises, in practically all cases the argument for not going to war is obvious (unless going to war is assumed to be sort of the natural and default inclination). In none of the cases were there any compelling incentives to attack. Indeed the overwhelming incentives were to not attack. That most of these so-called crises are dismissed as insignificant by many senior political leaders underscores the point that an attack was not actively contemplated at the highest levels. The lack of incentive to attack is especially true of India, whose actions bear a certain resemblance to what historian Paul Kennedy said of Britain during the years between the first and second world war, ???these were the actions of a country with nothing to gain, and much to lose, by being involved in war. Peace, in such circumstances, was the greatest of national interests??? (P Kennedy (1981), The Realities behind Diplomacy, Allen and Unwin, London). No Evidence Even if one were to go along with the authors and assume that there were compelling incentives to attack, then what is needed to substantiate the contention that nuclear deterrence was the primary if not sole preventive factor is evidence of senior policy makers and military explicitly pointing to the possibility of nuclear retaliation as the reason to call off their attack plans. This kind of evidence is just not provided in the book. One might argue that this is setting the bar too high ??“ but with an issue as grave as nuclear weaponry, with the likely consequences being so catastrophic, less will simply not do. The burden of proof rests upon those who make claims about nuclear weapons and their capacity to deter war, and the authors do not shoulder this burden adequately. Take the 2001-02 crisis for example. Was India really planning to go to full-scale war in 2002? It would seem that such a course would be akin to burning the house to kill the mice. Burning the neighbour??™s house, in this case. What one does know about mice and burnt houses is that the mice do not go away. Similarly, it would be foolish to assume that an assault on Pakistan would actually end the problem of militancy in Kashmir. This is clear to many senior military personnel. In the words of major general (retd) Ashok K Mehta, ???the paramount reason for India??™s ???restraint??? was the knowledge that any military action would not achieve the political objective of stopping cross border terrorism. It would inflict punishment but not extract total compliance within the threshold of limited war, the gains from which were estimated to be of doubtful utility. The cardinal principle of war (which is the failure of diplomacy) is that you don??™t start it unless you are sure you can end it by being better off??? (Ashok K Mehta (2003), ???India was on Brink of War Twice??™, Rediff on the Net, January 2, also available at http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/jan/02ashok.htm). More important for the purposes of examining the thesis of Ganguly and Hagerty, he also goes on to state, ???India chose not to cross the Rubicon for other reasons. Pakistan??™s military and nuclear deterrence was not one of them???. Mehta is not the only military leader to make this point. Another example is general V P Malik, former chief of army staff, who stated that nuclear weapons were largely irrelevant for conventional warfare and played no deterrent role during the Kargil war or in the 2002 crisis. It is also worth pointing out the contradictory nature of the claims made about the efficacy of nuclear deterrence in south Asia (Achin Vanaik (2002), ???Deterrence or a Deadly Game? Nuclear Propaganda and Reality in South Asia??™, Disarmament Diplomacy, September, (66). On the one hand, prime minister Vajpayee claimed that the 2002 crisis showed that India had, in effect, successfully called Pakistan??™s nuclear bluff. On the other hand, Abdul Kalam claimed that nuclear weapons had averted any kind of war. (Embarrassingly, this was in essence the same claim as that made by Pakistani president Musharraf and contrary to what prime minister Vajpayee was saying). Military leaders like V P Malik, as mentioned, felt nuclear weapons played no role. There is a corollary to all this counter-evidence about the irrelevance of nuclear deterrence. Despite knowing fully well that the other side is armed with nuclear weapons, capable of inflicting immense damage, the fact that senior military personnel and political leaders do and did contemplate war suggests that nuclear arsenals do not come with some objective property called deterrence. (Aside: Those who speak of a ???deterrent??? are guilty of reification, treating an abstraction as if it substantially existed as a concrete material object.) Raising the Ante Realists try to get around this problem by asserting that wars in the presence of nuclear weapons will only be limited ones, with clear thresholds that are not crossed. Again the weight of evidence is against them: if circumstances demanded it, each and every threshold will be crossed. Within the south Asian context, senior military officers have sought to ???up the ante??? on many occasions, and succeeded in the task on some of those occasions. For example, on p 154, the authors describe the events between May 18 and 24, 1999, during the Kargil war, when the Indian army sought the help of the air force. On May 18, the cabinet committee on security (CCS) recommended against the use of airpower, since it constituted an escalation and an enlargement of the scope of the conflict, and refused permission. A few days later on May 24, after visits to army headquarters in Kashmir, the army chief tried again and this time was successful in persuading the CCS to escalate the conflict. The air force carried out the first air strikes on May 26. While Pakistan did not respond in kind, partly because it was anxious to keep up the deception that the attackers were Mujahideen, under other circumstances it may well order air strikes of its own. Though nuclear weapons cannot be credited with preventing war, they are certainly responsible for destabilising the region and provoking crises. India and Pakistan have had more military crises over the last 20 years than any other 20 year period. This propensity for crises among nuclear weapon states is what was alluded to when discussing Jackie Coogan??™s role in ???The Kid??™. Even realists sometimes admit to this property; the best known formulation is Glenn Snyder??™s Stability Instability Paradox (a paradox only if nuclear weapons are assumed to induce stability). What realists are generally loath to admit is that some of these crises may develop into a major war, either because events spin out of control or because of accidents, which are especially prone to be misinterpreted as acts of war at times of crises. In south Asia, nuclear weapons can take credit for more than causing crises ??“ their presence was responsible for the Kargil war, estimated to have cost at least 1,714 Indian lives and 772 Pakistani ones. Plans for a Kargil-style operation had been hatched by the Pakistani military much earlier; in 1996, military officers were confident enough of these plans that they presented it to Benazir Bhutto, the prime minister of Pakistan. But she vetoed the idea. With the 1998 tests and the presence of a nuclear arsenal in Pakistan demonstrated beyond doubt, the operation could not be vetoed, even by Nawaz Sharif, who was politically much stronger than Benazir Bhutto when it came to dealing with the army. Fearful Symmetry shows what shaky and flimsy foundations underlie the theory of nuclear deterrence, the nearest word to gospel truth in the minds of realists. One can be sure that among the converted, this book will be cited as having demonstrated that it is nuclear deterrence that keeps India and Pakistan from going to war, when the book offers little concrete evidence of that claim. Already, some of the high priests of the church of realism, including Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer, have given the book their blessings, praising it highly. It is therefore important that books like this are adequately and widely criticised. If not, such ideas will quickly become common sense (not to be confused with good sense). --------------------------- [2] From: Sukla Sen <suklasen@yahoo.com> Date: Sat Dec 31, 2005 Subject: This New Year: Let's All Imagine! Imagine there's no countries, It isnt hard to do, Nothing to kill or die for, No religion too, Imagine all the people living life in peace... ... You may say Im a dreamer, but Im not the only one, I hope some day you'll join us, And the world will live as one. John Lennon ---------------------------------- [3] From: Sukla Sen <suklasen@yahoo.com> Date: Fri Dec 30, 2005 Subject: Nuclear Clouds Gather over Asia http://www.antiwar.com/bidwai/?articleid=8315 December 29, 2005 Nuclear Clouds Gather Over Asia by Praful Bidwai NEW DELHI - The Asia-Pacific region has not only emerged as one of the main engines of the world economy, it has also taken the global center stage in developments pertaining to nuclear weapons and efforts to acquire a capability to make them. From Iran and Israel in West Asia, through India and Pakistan in South Asia, to North Korea and Japan in the East, the region exhibited, in 2005, unprecedented activity in the nuclear field that can only intensify in the coming years. In each of these countries, the United States plays a major role. Its policies of selectively favoring or opposing their nuclear activities will alter the strategic balance in some of the world's most volatile regions. "This is a marked shift from the Cold War period, where the global nuclear center of gravity lay in the all-out confrontation between the Eastern and Western blocs, which was most intense in Europe," says Achin Vanaik, professor of international relations and global politics at Delhi University. He is also a member of the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace and an independent nuclear expert. "Regrettably, Asia's nuclear developments are dominated by a superpower that has set its face firmly against nuclear disarmament." 2005 witnessed two landmark nuclear developments??“ an attempt by the U.S. and its allies to censure Iran and prevent it from enriching uranium, either for military or civilian purposes, and an Indo-U.S. agreement to "normalize" India's nuclear weapons status and resume civilian nuclear commerce with it. Talks continued in 2005 between North Korea and other nations led by the U.S., which included China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, and the European Union, to dissuade Pyongyang from pursuing its nuclear weapons program. These did not resolve the issue. Meanwhile, Japan moved closer toward revising its post-World War II commitment not to make or acquire nuclear weapons and not to build a large-scale standing army. This acquires great significance in the context of what has been called a "new Cold War" between Japan and China. In September, the U.S. brought a motion in the board of governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) holding Iran "noncompliant" with its obligations under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and paving the way for referring it to the United Nations Security Council for possible sanctions. The resolution could be passed because India broke ranks with the nonaligned movement at the IAEA and voted with Washington. Iran rejected the resolution and reiterated its right under the NPT to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes. Russia has since proposed a compromise, under which Iran can convert yellowcake (oxides of uranium) into hexafluoride gas to be sent to Russia for enrichment. Under the compromise, Iran can burn the enriched uranium in a power reactor, being built with Russian help, but would send back the spent fuel to Russia. Iran will thus forswear reprocessing to extract plutonium, which, like highly enriched uranium, is used to make nuclear bombs. Iran has not formally rejected the proposal, but its talks with the European Union-3 (Germany, France, and Britain) have not yielded results. Tehran's nuclear posture and activities have drawn a hostile response from Israel and the U.S. President George W. Bush again returned to his "Axis of Evil" characterization. The U.S. reportedly has drawn up plans for an armed attack on Iran. A war of words meanwhile broke out between Iran and Israel. In October, Iran's newly elected president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called for Israel to be "wiped off the world's map." Israeli leaders have vowed to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon said on Dec. 1 that Israel would not allow Iran to do so. "Israel, and not only Israel, cannot accept a situation in which Iran would be in possession of nuclear weapons," Sharon said. Former prime minister Benyamin Netanyahu has held out a scarcely veiled threat to destroy Iran's nuclear installations, approvingly citing Israel's 1981 bombing of Iraq's Osirak research reactor, then under construction. On Dec. 16, Iran warned Israel that its response to an Israeli attack would be "swift, firm, and destructive." "What all this highlights is the potential for a dangerous conflict in the Middle East," says Vanaik. "The region has already become explosively volatile because of the occupation of Iraq, coming on top of the Palestinian crisis. If the U.S. and Israel persist with a hardline approach to Iran, they could create havoc. U.S. double standards ??“ hostility to Iran, coupled with its support to Israel's nuclear weapons program ??“ are a source of great popular discontent in the region." Washington's double standards are evident in South Asia, too. It agreed to make a one-time exception in the international nuclear nonproliferation regime for India by accepting that India is a "responsible" nuclear weapons state, although it has not signed the NPT. The Bush administration offered to persuade the U.S. Congress to amend nonproliferation laws and to plead for a similar exception for India in the Nuclear Suppliers' Group. India and the U.S. are developing a "strategic partnership," including extensive military cooperation. In March, Washington offered to help India become a great world power in the 21st century. This has rankled Pakistan, which sees the Indo-U.S. "partnership" as introducing regional strategic asymmetry. Pakistan is likely to demand similar treatment for itself regarding nuclear technology and equipment, and is drawing up plans for new nuclear power stations. The U.S. is doing little to defuse the Indo-Pakistan nuclear rivalry. It is embarrassed by disclosures about the clandestine activities of the Abdul Qadeer Khan network, which sold uranium enrichment technology to Iran, North Korea, and Libya. But Washington needs Pakistan as an ally in the "war against terrorism," in particular, the Taliban and al-Qaeda. It has resisted applying pressure on Pakistan to subject Khan to thorough interrogation to detail his nuclear transactions. The hardline approach of the U.S. to Iran's nuclear activities contrasts with its soft approach to North Korea, despite Pyongyang's claim that it already has a nuclear weapon. It is offering inducements to North Korea, including a civilian nuclear reactor, and economic aid, although it rejects the demand that the reactor's construction should precede the dismantling of Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program "Washington's nonproliferation criteria are selective, discriminatory, and inconsistent," says Vanaik. "It uses nonproliferation as a weapon when that suits its short-term interests. When it doesn't, it allows nuclear weapons technologies to proliferate." A worrisome example of this may be Japan. The country's constitution, dictated by the U.S. during its postwar occupation, forbids the acquisition, manufacture, or "bringing in" of nuclear weapons. Many conservative politicians in Japan want the statute amended. Japan has stockpiled huge amounts of plutonium, reprocessed in Western Europe, ostensibly to feed its fast breeder reactors but with the potential for quick diversion to military uses. Should Japan acquire nuclear weapons and continue its military buildup, China will react. Already, China feels threatened by Washington's ballistic missile defense program and by growing Indo-U.S. military collaboration. If present trends continue, Asia could witness two new arms races ??“ one between Japan and China, and the other between China and India. These rivalries will not be driven entirely by regional factors but will have a strong extra-regional influence, that of the U.S. As the Asia-Pacific region transits into 2006, it seems headed for turmoil and instability. (Inter Press Service) -------------------------------------------------- |
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