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Subject: [India Thinkers Net]Happy Holi to all thinkers - March14, 2006




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HAPPY HOLI  TO ALL THINKERS

the.moderator
India Thinkers Net
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[1]

From: Sukla Sen <suklasen@yahoo.com>
Date: Mon Mar 13, 2006
Subject: India's non-proliferation record challenged  

<http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006\03\12\story_12-3-200\
   6_pg7_11>

   India's non-proliferation record challenged

   By Khalid Hasan

-------------------

[2]

From: Parvez Jamasji <parvez1942@yahoo.com>
Date: Mon Mar 13, 2006
Subject: Re: [ZESTGlobal] Terrorist Explosions : Why to blame only Muslims : Dr. M. K. Sherwani  

No ! No ! No! Dr.
   There are netas behind them, the roll models that they are; what can be
expected ?

   The propensity that WE Indians have for the unethical, unjust, unfair & plain
simple crooked is obvious; is it not ?

   Little surprise then, if we have mayhem instigated by the netas & blamed on to
others, in this case Muslims; or the culprits take advantage of this fissiparous
situation & tendencies.

   But the sad part is, in the demonstrations in Lucknow, Delhi, Bombay, etc,
there were placards & posters lionising Osama Bin Laden.
   Is he a national - Indian - Hero to counter Bush of USA ???????
   Is he the chosen roll model by muslims, to mitigate all that ails them
???????????????????????

   What kind of signal would I or you send out, if we went round with Osama's
picture as if he was some kind of Prophet ?????????????
   Morden day Darth Vader, perhaps ?

   Do we then complain that we have a 'Right' to carry our hero's picture, but we
should not be ignored nor shunned or DISCRIMINATED against ?

   You rightly question "" the presumption that it is Muslims and Muslims only
who are indulging in such activities.""

   Why do you presume ""Three 'innocent' Muslims have been killed"" ???

   netas like CSWs have no religion - only CSWs are better humans beings, in that
they do an honest days work in trying circumstances to earn their livelihood;
this cannot be said of netas.

   Thanks for your time

   Best Wishes

   Parvez Jamasji
http://www.geocities.com/siafdu/vc81.html

   CONTACT Parvez / Zarin   :
   E      :   parvez1942@yahoo.com
         :   parvezjamasji@hotmail.com
       Tel   : 91-22-2412 1656 > 9 am to 9 pm = GMT + 5 1/2 hrs.
Mob  : 91 - 98208 13951 \ 98201 88926
Dadar, Bombay - 400 014, India




Sherwani Mustafa <sherwanimk@yahoo.com> wrote:
        While condemning the perpetrators of terrorist
explosions and other similar crimes, I assail with
equal force the fast growing tendency that it is only
Muslims and Muslim groups behind them.

-----------------

[3]

From: rkurian@bgl.vsnl.net.in
Date: Mon Mar 13, 2006
Subject: Hard Times for Soft Drinks...

Hard Times for Soft Drinks
By Michael Blanding, AlterNet
Posted on March 13, 2006, Printed on March 13, 2006

http://www.alternet.org/story/33380/

-----------------------------

[4]

From: Sukla Sen <suklasen@yahoo.com>
Date: Mon Mar 13, 2006
Subject: Transmutation of Indo-Pak-US Triangle  

US ties with India and Pakistan on divergent paths

  Reuters

  Sunday, March 12, 2006

  By Carol Giacomo, Diplomatic CorrespondentSun Mar 12, 12:11 PM ET

  President George W. Bush's visit to India and Pakistan this month underscored dramatically the increasingly divergent U.S. approaches to  the South Asian nuclear rivals.

India is the celebrated rising democratic power for whom Washington is willing to jettison 30 years of non-proliferation policy so New Delhi  can buy U.S. nuclear energy technology.

Pakistan, its future stability in question, gets nudged by Washington  to do more to fight terrorism and to expand democratic freedoms.

"If Pakistan is going to judge its relationship with the United States  by how close the United States is to India, it's bound to be  disappointed because the U.S.-India relationship is at a historic  high-water point," said Teresita Schaffer of the Center for Strategic  and International Studies.

India, whose relations with the United States were long mired in Cold  War politics, is now basking in the glow of the landmark nuclear energy  deal and of being anointed by Bush as a global power central to U.S. geopolitical strategy.

In Pakistan, by contrast, commentators expressed concern that President Pervez Musharraf had little to show for an alliance with Washington  that has pitted its army against its own people in the post-September  11 hunt for al Qaeda militants on the Afghan border.

Many Americans "aren't understanding the level of anxiety Pakistanis  now feel and how Musharraf is seen as being pushed in a corner," said  Alan Kronstadt, South Asia analyst for the Library of Congress's  Congressional Research Service.

This was underscored by Bush's unusually public rejection of  Musharraf's request that Pakistan get a nuclear deal like India's,  Kronstadt said.

Beyond the visit itself, "there was really nothing given to Musharraf  ... India got a huge gift in the nuclear deal and Pakistan got a pat on  the back and advice to do more on terrorism and on democracy,"  Kronstadt told Reuters.

DIFFERENT PATHS

Richard Boucher, assistant secretary of state for South Asia and  Central Asia, noted that Bush announced U.S.-Pakistani partnerships and  dialogues on strategic issues, education, energy and economics.

"We believe that these respond to Pakistan's needs as it develops a stable, modern, prosperous and democratic society ... (and) the real  test is whether we are helping the Pakistani people move into a better  future," he told Reuters.

Pakistan, one of the largest U.S. aid recipients, remains a valued ally in the war on terrorism, but is not seen by Washington as measuring up  to India as a democracy or a state willing to guard against weapons proliferation.

Pakistan's former top nuclear scientist ran a black market that sold technology to Libya, North Korea and Iran.

Pakistan's anxiety over its U.S. ties is long-standing. The two were allies in the 1980s struggle against the Soviet occupation of  Afghanistan, but once the Soviets withdrew, relations cooled -- in  large measure because of U.S. concern over Pakistan's nuclear-weapons  program.

Although Washington has worked to dispel this notion, "there is a  common fear in Pakistan that the United States is going to wash its  hands" of the relationship, Kronstadt said.

Bush's visit was intended to underscore U.S. support and he "paid a lot of attention to Musharraf," said Schaffer.

But she criticized the administration for focusing too much on personal ties with Musharraf and for not reaching out to political opposition  and civil society groups crucial to Pakistan's democratic evolution.

Some analysts worry the enthusiastic U.S. embrace of India --  especially the landmark nuclear deal -- is encouraging Pakistan to lean  more heavily on its long-time ally China.

"Pakistan feels endangered by the closer U.S.-India relationship (and) while the United States will try to keep relations with Musharraf  strong, Musharraf will be able to play the two (U.S. and China) off  against each other," said Daniel Blumenthal, a former Pentagon official.

Reuters Limited.



----------------

[5]

From: Sukla Sen <suklasen@yahoo.com>
Date: Mon Mar 13, 2006
Subject: Canada: The True Mother of the Indian Bomb!
I.
  Carnegie Issue Brief __13 March 2006
  Vol. 9, No. 4

  Oh Canada!
  By Joseph Cirincione

  U.S. President George Bush last week struck a deal with India that
directly violates the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT, as well  as
several major U.S. laws, setting off waves of criticism in the  states and
around the world. Canadian officials have not been part of  that criticism.
Instead, the nation that helped India build its first  nuclear weapon may
now help India build dozens more.

 The Bush  deal would directly encourage and assist India's nuclear bomb
program,  in contradiction to Article 1 of the NPT that prohibits any
signatory  nation from helping another nation develop nuclear weapons.
Fortunately, before President Bush can sell one gram of uranium to  India,
the U.S. Congress will have to approve changes to U.S. laws.  Congress could
block or amend the agreement. Senior members of both  parties have indicated
their deep concerns about the deal and the  precedent it sets for other
nations, including Iran. The reaction has  been so negative that the Indian
ambassador to the United States  complained, "the nonproliferation
ideologues have high jacked the  debate."

 Still, other nations, including France, Russia and  Canada, are tempted by
the profits to be made in nuclear sales to the  world's second most populous
nation. The nuclear industries in these  countries are salivating at the
prospect of billions of dollars in  trade and hoping that the construction
of dozens of new reactors in  India and China could restart their
long-stalled industry, launching a  new wave of nuclear power around the
world. So-called "realists" in the  foreign policy establishments dismiss
proliferation concerns, focusing  instead on the need to forge strong ties
with India. Neoconservatives  are eager to forge a grand alliance against
China. For them, as one  architect of the deal told my colleague, the
problem is not that India  has nuclear weapons; it is that it does not have
enough nuclear weapons.

  Canada will play a key role in determining whether this deal lives or
dies. Canada has a special responsibility in this matter. More than any
Indian scientist, Canada can be called the true mother of the Indian
nuclear bomb.

 Canada began its nuclear cooperation with India  fifty years ago. In 1955,
Canada agreed to build a 40MW research  reactor for India, known as the
CIRUS (Canada-India Reactor, US)  reactor. India promised that both the
reactor and the related fissile  materials would only be used for peaceful
purposes. Canada supplied  half the initial uranium fuel for the reactor and
the United States  supplied the other half, plus heavy water to moderate the
nuclear  reactions. Canada signed two cooperation agreements that provided
India  with designs for the CANDU-type reactor. Many of India's nuclear
reactors, both operational and planned, are based on CANDU technology  and
designs received from Canada.

 All were supposed to be  exclusively for peaceful use. But in 1974, India
cheated on its  commitments. It took out fuel rods from the CIRUS reactor,
extracted  the plutonium from those rods and detonated its first nuclear
test.  India called it a "peaceful" nuclear explosion, but the country now
admits it was a test of a weapon design. In response, Canada ceased all
nuclear cooperation with India.

 Now, following the US lead,  Canada has begun to revive that cooperation.
In September 2005,  Canadian Foreign Minister Pettigrew met with Indian
External Affairs  Minister Singh and agreed to forget this history and let
bygones be  bygones. Significantly, they agreed to develop a broad bilateral
cooperation framework, possibly by mid-2006. Canada agreed to open the
supply of nuclear technology to any Indian civilian nuclear facility.  This
means that Canada, too, will violate the NPT. It will break  Canadian laws
that now require that a nuclear cooperation agreement  only be concluded
with a state that has signed the NPT (which India  refuses to do) or has
accepted full-scope safeguards (which India has  not).

 Full-scope safeguards means that a country agrees that  all its nuclear
facilities will be open to thorough inspection by the  International Atomic
Energy Agency. These inspectors will make sure  that no nuclear fuel is
diverted to weapons purposes. But the Bush  India deal exempts fully
one-third of India's reactors from any  inspections. It does not matter that
inspectors will be allowed in to  the others. If the deal stands, India will
use foreign fuel for its  power reactors, freeing up Indian uranium for its
military reactors.  India will be able to double or triple the number of
weapons it can  make annually. They could go from the 6-10 they could
currently produce  to 30 a year.

 The consequences could be severe. Regionally,  it could ignite a new
nuclear arms race. Pakistan will not stand idly  by, nor will China. What
will Japan do, a country that signed the NPT,  but now sees India reaping
the benefits of standing outside the treaty?

  Globally, the deal cripples the main diplomatic and legal barrier to  the
spread of nuclear weapons. The United States is now trying to  restrain the
Iranian program by relying on the very treaty it has just  weakened with the
India deal.

 There are ways to fix this deal  to minimize the damage, including getting
India to promise to cease all  further production of nuclear bomb material
(the way all other nuclear  weapon states have, save Pakistan). Canadian
officials can help. But  they must now decide if they want to. A bit of
reflection on their past  history with India wouldn't hurt.

  II.
  http://nobmdeh.blogspot.com/2006/03/canada-true-mother-of-indian-bomb.html

  Saturday, March 11, 2006
  Canada: 'True Mother of the Indian Bomb'
  A couple of days ago, I took a poke at the Globe & Mail for not  devoting
enough attention to the Canadian angle on the story about  George Bush's
plan to increase nuclear cooperation with non-NPT  signatory India.

 To give credit where it's due, I thought I'd  point out that the Globe
today published a strong op-ed by Joseph  Cirincione of the Carnegie
Endowment for Peace entitled 'Let's not help  India build more nuclear
weapons.'

 Cirincione's 'more' of  course, refers to Canada's own history of
contributing to India's  nuclear weapons program. As he points out,

      [Canada] has a special responsibility in this matter -- more than any
Indian scientist, this country can be called the true mother of the  Indian
nuclear bomb. In 1955, Canada agreed to build a 40MW research  reactor for
India, known as the CIRUS  (Canada-India-Reactor-United-States).

      India promised that both the reactor and related fissile materials
would only be used for peaceful purposes. Canada supplied half the  initial
uranium fuel for the reactor; the U.S. supplied the other half,  plus heavy
water to moderate the nuclear reactions. Canada signed two  co-operation
agreements with India: Many of its nuclear reactors, both  operational and
planned, are based on CANDU technology and designs.

      All were supposed to be exclusively for peaceful  use. But in 1974,
India cheated on its commitments. It took fuel rods  from the CIRUS reactor,
extracted the plutonium and detonated its first  nuclear test. India called
it a "peaceful" nuclear explosion, but the  country now admits it was a test
of a weapon design. In response,  Canada ceased all nuclear co-operation
with India.

 Former  foreign affairs minister Pierre Pettigrew announced Canada's
about-face  on the policy last fall, as some of this blog's readers may
recall.

  Cirincione puts it this way:

      In September, then-foreign affairs minister Pierre  Pettigrew met with
his Indian counterpart, Natwar Singh, and agreed to  let bygones be bygones.
Significantly, they agreed to develop a broad  bilateral co-operation
framework, possibly by mid-2006. Canada agreed  to open the supply of
nuclear technology to any Indian civilian nuclear  facility.

     In other words, Canada, too,  will violate the NPT. It will break
Canadian laws that now require that  a nuclear co-operation agreement only
be concluded with a state that  has signed the NPT (which India refuses to
do) or has accepted  full-scope safeguards (which India has not).

 As I pointed out  in my recent post, Pettigrew also made highly misleading
comments when  he announced our government's policy change, claiming last
September  that an Indian policy firmly separating military from civilian
nuclear  activity was already effectively in place, even though that claim
was  at odds with the facts then, as it is today.

 Like other  critics of the recent shifts in nuclear cooperation policy by
the US,  Canada and France, Cirincione asks us to look beyond short-term
political and economic gains and think about the bigger nuclear
non-proliferation picture.

 It amounts to this: how can we be  holding Iran to every jot and tittle of
the Nuclear Non Proliferation  Treaty (NPT), while carving out exceptions
for India that effectively  ignore our own obligations under that same
treaty?

 (Not that  ignoring obligations is limited to this Indian deal, of course:
in my  view, all of the nuclear powers ought to be doing a lot more to
fulfill  their obligations under Article VI of the NPT to eliminate their
nuclear weapons.)

 Taking a similar approach to Cirincione is  Daryl Kimball of the Arms
Control Association, who has recently offered  a number of salient
criticisms of the proposed deal on Indian nuclear  cooperation. Here's one:

     The import of  nuclear fuel from foreign suppliers also would free up
India to use its  limited domestic reserves of uranium for the sole purpose
of building  weapons. India previously had to choose between using this
material for  energy or bombs.

 So, will Canada's planned increase in  nuclear cooperation with India come
into play here? It seems likely,  given that we're a major uranium exporter,
and are now re-thinking our  policy on nuclear cooperation with India.

 Kimball also points  out that deals weakening the NPT by creating
exceptions for India could  set a dangerous precedent. Suppose China decides
in a couple of years  that it wants to establish an India-style deal with
Pakistan, Kimball  asks?

     The U.S.-India deal would create a  precedent that other countries
might attempt to exploit. The United  States may not advocate a similar
initiative for Pakistan, but China  might. China and Pakistan have a history
of nuclear cooperation and  have reportedly discussed ways to expand this
relationship. China is a  member of the 45-member NSG [Nuclear Suppliers
Group], which operates  by consensus, and could tie its consent to the
U.S.-India deal to a  similar exception for Pakistan.

 Even though Pakistan is a  known proliferator, it's not impossible that
China, countering American  efforts in the region, might decide to create
its own 'nuclear side  deal' with India's nuclear rival, Pakistan.

  The prospect is not comforting, to say the least.

  Now, Cirincione concludes his op-ed by saying that Canadian 'officials'
face a crucial choice: will they help strengthen the international
non-proliferation regime, or will they help weaken it by going along  with
Bush's policy on nuclear cooperation with India?

  Cirincione poses a good question, but I'd go one step farther and ask
whether we, as citizens of Canada, are going to let our 'officials'  make
that choice without our input? Or might we e-mail them, for  instance?

 In my view, given Canada's history as the 'true  mother of the Indian
bomb,' we shouldn't allow ourselves to become  either mother or midwife to
further nuclear weapons development on the  Indian subcontinent.

  In fact, we have an obligation to make sure that doesn't happen.

  # posted by Stephen : 11:46 PM


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